State v. Kevin Buchanan
572 S.W.3d 746
Tex. App.2019Background
- The State (Texas, City of Garland, and Dallas transit authority) sued Kevin Buchanan, the court-appointed receiver for Brooklyn’s Firewheel, LLC, to collect delinquent sales- and use-tax trust funds that Buchanan had collected but not remitted.
- The State sought about $29,690 in combined state, municipal, and transit-authority taxes and pleaded for recovery of attorney’s fees under Tex. Gov’t Code § 2107.006.
- At trial the jury found for the State on the tax liability (accepting the Comptroller’s certificate) but answered “0” to the question asking for a reasonable attorney’s fee for the State’s counsel.
- The State moved to disregard the zero-fee finding or, alternatively, for a new trial, arguing fees are mandatory under § 2107.006 and the zero verdict lacked evidentiary support; the trial court nevertheless entered judgment awarding no fees and denied a new trial.
- On appeal the State argued (1) an award of fees is mandatory under § 2107.006 and (2) the jury’s zero-fee finding is factually insufficient given attorney testimony about hours and rates.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether fees under Tex. Gov’t Code § 2107.006 are mandatory | Section 2107.006’s “may recover” provision is mandatory once fees are pleaded and proved | Jury question wording (“if any”) allowed jury discretion not to award fees; State waived complaint by not objecting | Court held the statute mandates fees if proven; award was not discretionary |
| Whether State waived challenge to jury question wording | State preserved issue via motion to disregard/alternative new trial asserting statutory right | Buchanan argued lack of objection to question forfeited the complaint | Court held State did not waive because availability of fees is a legal question for the court and was preserved by postverdict motions |
| Factual sufficiency of jury’s zero-fee award | Attorney testified to hours, reasonable rates, and services rendered; evidence supports some award | Buchanan argued the hours were excessive and case simple, so zero (or small) fee reasonable | Court held zero award was against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence and remanded fees for new trial |
Key Cases Cited
- Holland v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 1 S.W.3d 91 (Tex. 1999) (availability of fees under a statute is a legal question and jury’s fee verdict is immaterial to statutory entitlement)
- Bocquet v. Herring, 972 S.W.2d 19 (Tex. 1998) (statutes stating a party “may recover” attorney’s fees are not discretionary)
- Ventling v. Johnson, 466 S.W.3d 143 (Tex. 2015) (trial court cannot deny fees when evidence shows they are reasonable and necessary under a statute providing recovery)
- In re Bent, 487 S.W.3d 170 (Tex. 2016) (interpreting “may obtain” language to render fee awards mandatory when statutory prerequisites are satisfied)
- Midland W. Bldg., L.L.C. v. First Serv. Air Conditioning Contractors, Inc., 300 S.W.3d 738 (Tex. 2009) (zero-fee awards improper absent evidence affirmatively showing no services were needed or of no value)
