State v. Kershaw, 302 Kan. 772

Background

Kershaw shot at uniformed police officers after a domestic dispute; officers returned fire and arrested him. He later claimed heavy intoxication and inability to form intent.
The State charged him with four counts of aggravated assault of a law enforcement officer with a deadly weapon (under K.S.A. 21-5412) and one count of domestic battery.
Kershaw provided a psychiatric report opining he was too intoxicated/medicated to form intent; the district court allowed the expert to testify generally about substance effects but excluded testimony that he lacked specific intent.
The district court instructed the jury that voluntary intoxication is not a defense to aggravated assault of a law enforcement officer; the jury convicted on the four aggravated assault counts.
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding the instruction was clearly erroneous because it negated the required mental state of "knowingly." The State petitioned for review.
The Kansas Supreme Court granted review and affirmed the district court, holding the offense is a general intent crime and voluntary intoxication is not a defense.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Kershaw)	Held
Whether aggravated assault of a law enforcement officer with a deadly weapon is a general- or specific-intent crime	Statute uses "knowingly" and K.S.A. 21-5202 treats "knowingly" crimes as general intent	The Court of Appeals argued that applying a blanket "no voluntary intoxication" instruction relieved the State of proving the "knowingly" mental state	Court held the crime is a general intent crime because the statute prescribes "knowingly," so it is a general intent offense
Whether voluntary intoxication is a defense to this charged offense	Voluntary intoxication is not a defense to general intent crimes; thus the instruction was proper	Kershaw argued intoxication negated the requisite culpability and the instruction improperly relieved the State of proving intent	Court held voluntary intoxication is not a defense to general intent crimes and the instruction was legally appropriate
Whether the district court erred by instructing the jury "voluntary intoxication is not a defense" without objection	Instruction correctly stated existing law and did not remove element burden	Kershaw argued the instruction was clearly erroneous and deprived him of presenting a defense	Court held no clear error; jury was entitled to be told the applicable law
Whether the Court of Appeals properly reversed convictions based on the intoxication instruction	State argued the Court of Appeals erred by treating the instruction as negating the mental state	Court of Appeals found instruction relieved State of proving "knowingly"	Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed convictions

Key Cases Cited

State v. Hobbs, 301 Kan. 203 (opinion interpreting the scope of "knowingly" for aggravated offenses)
State v. Plummer, 295 Kan. 156 (standards of review for jury instruction issues)
State v. Hilt, 299 Kan. 176 (voluntary intoxication may negate intent only for specific-intent crimes)
State v. Sterling, 235 Kan. 526 (historical rule that voluntary intoxication is not a defense to general intent crimes)
State v. Bee, 288 Kan. 733 (presumption that legislature acted with knowledge of existing law)