State v. Kennedy, 354 P.3d 775

Background

On December 10, 2011, Torez (a drug dealer) was shot and killed in a sedan during an apparent robbery; Kennedy had driven Torez to the parking lot in an SUV and remained in the vehicle during the incident.
After the shooting, three individuals approached Kennedy’s SUV; witnesses conflict on whether Kennedy recognized and invited them into her vehicle.
Kennedy drove away with four passengers (including one shooter, Corona); passengers told her (per one witness) that Corona had shot Torez.
Kennedy was charged with obstruction of justice, enhanced to a first-degree felony on the theory she acted in concert with multiple people; she argued she lacked the requisite intent because she did not know a crime had been committed.
The trial court denied Kennedy’s proposed mistake-of-fact instruction and gave general mental-state Instruction 15 and a crime-specific Instruction 19 requiring intent to hinder investigation and that she knew or should have known the underlying listed crimes.
The jury convicted; on appeal Kennedy argued (1) Instruction 15 was vague and could allow conviction on lesser mental states, (2) the trial court erred by refusing her mistake-of-fact instruction, and (3) the evidence was insufficient; the Court of Appeals affirmed.

Issues

Issue	State's Argument	Kennedy's Argument	Held
Whether Instruction 15 was misleading by listing multiple mental states such that jury could convict on knowing or reckless rather than specific intent	Jury instructions must be read as whole; Instruction 19 is crime-specific and requires intent, curing any ambiguity	Instruction 15’s phrasing could be read to allow conviction on knowing or reckless mental states	Unpreserved at trial; read together with Instruction 19, no reversible error — instructions fairly instructed the jury
Whether trial court erred by refusing Kennedy’s mistake-of-fact instruction	Instruction 19 already instructed that conviction requires intent to hinder and knowledge (or should-have-known) of listed crimes; proposed instruction would be duplicative	Her evidence supported mistake-of-fact and the jury needed the specific instruction to understand that belief negates intent	No error or abuse of discretion; existing instructions adequately covered the defense theory
Whether evidence was insufficient to prove intent to obstruct (raised as ineffective assistance because not preserved)	Viewing evidence in light most favorable to verdict, circumstantial evidence supported inference Kennedy knew a crime occurred and intended to hinder apprehension	Kennedy was an indifferent bystander and may have believed shots were directed at her or were self-defense; no proof she knew a felony occurred	Evidence was sufficient; reasonable inferences supported jury verdict; a directed-verdict motion would have been futile, so counsel’s failure to move did not constitute ineffective assistance
Applicability of preservation exceptions (plain error; ineffective assistance)	Exceptions need demonstrating of actual error or deficient counsel performance and prejudice; none shown because instructions were correct and insufficiency claim would fail	Argues plain error and ineffective assistance due to trial counsel not objecting to Instruction 15 and not moving for directed verdict	Neither exception applies: no plain instructional error; ineffective-assistance claim fails because objections/motions would have been futile

Key Cases Cited

State v. Maestas, 299 P.3d 892 (Utah 2012) (jury instructions reviewed as a whole)
State v. Berriel, 299 P.3d 1133 (Utah 2013) (defendant entitled to instruction when evidence supports theory; legal question reviewed for correctness)
State v. Nielsen, 326 P.3d 645 (Utah 2014) (standard for reversing for insufficient evidence)
State v. Bingham, 575 P.2d 197 (Utah 1978) (getaway-driver obstruction case finding insufficient evidence of knowledge of felony)
State v. Lucero, 866 P.2d 1 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (single imperfect instruction not reversible error when instructions as a whole are adequate)