426 P.3d 226
Or. Ct. App.2018Background
- Defendant was convicted of menacing (domestic violence) and reckless driving; separately found in contempt for violating a restraining order obtained by his wife, L.
- Incident: defendant photographed L at their son's apartment, then followed her for 30–40 minutes; L testified defendant bumped her minivan multiple times; officers found bumper marks matching defendant's license-plate screws.
- Defense: defendant denied contacting the minivan and said any proximity was coincidental; trial used same evidence for criminal charges and contempt finding.
- State sought to admit evidence of prior assaults by defendant on L (underlying the restraining-order petition) to show intent, lack of mistake (doctrine of chances), and reasonableness of L’s fear; trial court admitted that evidence.
- Defendant objected that the underlying allegations were highly prejudicial and argued they should be excluded; he did not explicitly say “OEC 403,” but argued unfair prejudice.
- On appeal, defendant argued the trial court failed to properly perform OEC 403 balancing (and, alternatively, misapplied nonpropensity purposes). The court reversed and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether trial court performed OEC 403 balancing before admitting prior-acts evidence | Trial court did balance or did so adequately; evidence relevant to intent, lack of mistake, and victim's fear | Objected that evidence was highly prejudicial and should be excluded under OEC 403 | Preservation: defendant’s objection preserved an OEC 403 claim despite no explicit citation; court treated objection as preserved |
| Whether prior assaults were admissible to prove "lack of mistake" (doctrine of chances) | Johns/doctrine of chances makes prior similar acts probative of lack of mistake | Contended doctrine inapplicable because defendant disputed that he performed the charged act at all | Held: doctrine of chances (lack of mistake) inapplicable because main dispute was whether defendant performed the act, so prior acts were not admissible for that purpose |
| Whether trial court erred in weighing probative value under OEC 403 | State: even if error, it was harmless or court would have admitted anyway | Defendant: court misappraised probative value by relying on an erroneous nonpropensity justification, so balancing was flawed | Held: trial court abused its discretion by misstating probative value (error not harmless); reversal and remand for proper OEC 403 balancing |
| Whether error was harmless given strength of state’s case | State: evidence strong; verdict would stand without prior-acts evidence | Defendant: prior-acts evidence could have affected credibility and verdict | Held: error not harmless — cannot say little likelihood the admission affected the jury; remand required |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Baughman, 361 Or. 386 (2017) (describes OEC 404(3)/403 framework and Mayfield four-step analysis)
- State v. Johns, 301 Or. 535 (1986) (doctrine of chances supports admission to show lack of mistake/intent)
- State v. Mayfield, 302 Or. 631 (1987) (prescribes four-step method for assessing other-acts evidence under OEC 403)
- State v. Tena, 362 Or. 514 (2018) (doctrine of chances does not apply when dispute is whether defendant performed the act at all)
- State v. Davis, 336 Or. 19 (2003) (harmless-error test: appellate court asks whether there was little likelihood that the error affected the verdict)