State v. Kauhane., 452 P.3d 359

Background:

On Aug. 20, 2015, Keith Kauhane participated in a protest on Crater Road against construction of the DKIST telescope; he and six others sat in the roadway and were arrested.
The State charged Kauhane with Failure to Disperse, Obstructing (HRS § 711-1105(1)(a)), and Disorderly Conduct; the Obstructing count tracked the statute but did not include the statutory definition of “obstructs.”
At trial the jury was instructed (by agreement) with the statutory definition of “obstructs” and with the choice-of-evils (necessity) defense; defense counsel in closing asked jurors to “walk in [Kauhane’s] shoes,” prompting a State “golden rule” objection that the court sustained.
The jury convicted Kauhane of Obstructing (acquitted on the other counts); he was sentenced to one day jail (credit time served), probation, fines and fees.
On appeal the ICA vacated and remanded for a new trial based on plain error for failure to give a mitigating instruction; the ICA rejected the contention that the complaint was deficient and held the golden-rule ruling harmless.
The Hawai‘i Supreme Court granted certiorari, held the complaint fatally defective for omitting an essential element (the statutory definition of “obstructs”), found the sustaining of the golden-rule objection erroneous but counsel’s argument proper, vacated the ICA judgment, and remanded with instructions to dismiss the Obstructing charge without prejudice.

Issues:

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the complaint was sufficient despite omitting the statutory definition of “obstructs”	The State: under the Motta/Wells standard (challenge raised on appeal) the charge is presumptively valid; the omission was not fatal because the statutory meaning is readily comprehensible and jury instructions supplied the definition, so no prejudice	Kauhane: omission of the statutory definition removed an essential element (that obstruction be "impassable without unreasonable inconvenience or hazard"), denying notice and due process; the complaint must be dismissed	Court: complaint defective. The statutory definition is an essential element distinct from the common meaning; omission fatally deprived defendant of notice — insufficient even under Motta/Wells — dismiss without prejudice
Whether sustaining the State’s “golden rule” objection improperly limited Kauhane’s ability to present the choice-of-evils defense	The State: sustaining the objection was proper and harmless because defense argument misstated the objective (reasonable person) standard for the necessity defense	Kauhane: the jury needed to be able to consider his subjective belief of imminent harm; asking jurors to “walk in his shoes” was a permissible way to convey that belief within the framework of the instruction	Court: sustaining the golden-rule objection was error (the comment was not classic golden-rule advocacy). Defense counsel’s reference to the defendant’s subjective belief was permissible; counsel must still tie that subjective belief to the objective/reasonableness requirement in the instruction

Key Cases Cited

State v. Motta, 66 Haw. 89, 657 P.2d 1019 (1983) (adopts liberal construction rule for challenges to charges raised first on appeal)
State v. Wells, 78 Haw. 373, 894 P.2d 70 (1995) (applies Motta rule to appellate challenges to charges)
State v. Wheeler, 121 Haw. 383, 219 P.3d 1170 (2009) (charge defective when statutory definition of a term altered common meaning and created an essential attendant circumstance)
State v. Pacquing, 139 Haw. 302, 389 P.3d 897 (2016) (statutory definition of a phrase must appear in the charge when it departs from common meaning)
State v. Sprattling, 99 Haw. 312, 55 P.3d 276 (2002) (contrast: omission of a modifier that is inherent in common meaning may not be fatal under Motta/Wells)
State v. Nesmith, 127 Haw. 48, 276 P.3d 617 (2012) (statutory language sufficient when it clearly sets out all essential elements)
State v. Aiwohi, 109 Haw. 115, 123 P.3d 1210 (2005) (discussing use of Model Penal Code commentaries in construing Hawai‘i Penal Code)
State v. Maumalanga, 90 Haw. 58, 976 P.2d 372 (1998) (choice-of-evils defense requires that belief be reasonably held; legislative framework incorporates a reasonable-person standard)