State v. K. Pennington, 517 P.3d 894

Pennington pled guilty to felony theft; the court deferred imposition of a six-year sentence on January 4, 2018 and placed her on formal probation.
Over 2018–2020 she committed multiple compliance violations: repeated alcohol use (including DUI-related incidents), a cocaine use admission, driving while suspended, and failure to notify probation of an employment change.
Probation imposed MIIG-guided interventions (24/7 alcohol monitoring, jail time, community service), but probation officer concluded Pennington continued to violate conditions and would not respond to further MIIG efforts.
The State filed a petition to revoke the deferred sentence; Pennington admitted three compliance violations at hearing, and the district court revoked the deferral and imposed a ten-year suspended prison sentence.
The district court’s sentence did not recite any specific record or recollection denying credit for elapsed time; Pennington appealed, arguing (1) the court lacked authority to revoke without MIIG exhaustion and (2) she was entitled to credit for elapsed time prior to revocation.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
1. May a court revoke a deferred felony sentence for compliance violations based on a finding the offender will not be responsive to further MIIG efforts?	State: Yes; §46-18-203(8)(c) permits revocation when court finds violations are compliance violations and offender won’t respond to further MIIG efforts (exhaustion not required).	Pennington: No; revocation under (8)(c) requires exhaustion of MIIG before imposing a sentence under subsection (7).	Affirmed: Court may revoke under §46-18-203(8)(c) on finding non-responsiveness to MIIG (exhaustion not required).
2. Is the offender entitled to credit for "elapsed time" served prior to revocation?	State: (At merits) acknowledged that if the Court addressed the issue it should remit for proper elapsed-time determination; generally disputed denial without specific record.	Pennington: She is entitled to credit for all elapsed time prior to first recorded violation (335 days) because the court gave no specific record or recollection of violations during that period.	Reversed in part and remanded: Court must grant credit for elapsed time; remand to amend sentence to reflect 335 days credit.

State v. Jardee, 461 P.3d 108 (Mont. 2020) (explains mandatory statutory steps and limits on district court discretion when awarding elapsed-time credit)
State v. Tippets, 509 P.3d 1 (Mont. 2022) (calculating credit for time served is a legal mandate reviewed de novo)
State v. Oropeza, 456 P.3d 1023 (Mont. 2020) (discusses MIIG; court here clarifies a misstatement in Oropeza regarding MIIG exhaustion)
City of Missoula v. Sadiku, 498 P.3d 765 (Mont. 2021) (interprets §46-18-203(8)(c); this Court clarifies prior misinterpretation)
State v. Kotwicki, 151 P.3d 982 (Mont. 2007) (sentencing within statutory parameters is reviewed for legality)