State v. Julianne Graham, 147 A.3d 639

Defendant was a CVU high‑school employee (paraeducator/program assistant) who worked with student K.S. during the 2013–2014 school year; supervisors later removed K.S. from her caseload.
Defendant was a "school‑year employee" under a collective bargaining agreement—contracts ran for the school year only; she was not under contract, employed, or supervising students during summer 2014.
In May 2014 CSSU initially said the position was eliminated, then offered a contract for 2014–2015 which defendant accepted; she resumed work under a new contract on August 25, 2014.
The State charged defendant with three counts of sexual exploitation of a minor (13 V.S.A. § 3258(a)) for sexual acts that allegedly occurred in summer 2014, alleging she was in a position of supervision "by virtue of" undertaking instruction of minors.
The superior court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of a prima facie case, concluding defendant was not in a position of supervision at the time of the acts because she was not employed/supervising during the summer. The State appealed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Graham)	Held
Whether defendant was "in a position of power, authority, or supervision" under § 3258(a) at the time of the alleged summer 2014 acts	Evidence supported leaving employment‑status question to jury: defendant had "reasonable assurance" of rehire, retained some benefits, and may have been subject to policies — so she remained effectively in a supervisory position	Defendant was a school‑year employee not under contract and had no supervisory responsibilities during summer 2014, so she was not in a qualifying position at the time	Court affirmed dismissal: defendant was not in a position of supervision during the summer; employment status facts did not create prima facie case
Whether § 3258(a) criminalizes sexual acts that occur after the actor’s supervisory/ instructional responsibilities have ended	The statute’s phrase "by virtue of the actor’s undertaking the responsibility" can encompass prior undertakings that created an ongoing position of power, leaving timing to the jury	The statutory language requires the actor to be in the position of supervision at the time of the sexual act; past responsibilities that have ended do not suffice	Court held the statute requires the formal supervisory relationship to exist when the sex act occurs; past duties alone do not create liability

State v. Baron, 176 Vt. 314, 848 A.2d 275 (Vt. 2004) (standard for reviewing motion to dismiss—evidence taken in State’s favor must fairly and reasonably tend to show guilt)
State v. Valyou, 180 Vt. 627, 910 A.2d 922 (Vt. 2006) (de novo review of whether State met the Rule 12(d) burden)
State v. Brunner, 196 Vt. 571, 99 A.3d 1019 (Vt. 2014) (statutory interpretation—give effect to legislative intent and plain meaning)
State v. LaBounty, 179 Vt. 199, 892 A.2d 203 (Vt. 2005) (rule of lenity: ambiguities in criminal statutes resolved for defendant)
State v. Fuller, 163 Vt. 523, 660 A.2d 302 (Vt. 1995) (caution against expanding penal statutes by implication)