291 A.3d 525
R.I.2023Background
- Two home invasions at Jeffrey Lebrun’s Pawtucket residence (May 19, 2013 and July 28, 2013); the July invasion resulted in Jeffrey’s death by gunshot.
- May incident: struggle with masked intruder; police recovered a black backpack containing burglary tools and a black sweatshirt; DNA testing linked Gibson to the sweatshirt, gloves, paper towel, and some cords found in the backpack.
- July incident: two men in black broke in, gunshots heard, two men fled; an eyewitness saw two runners; postmortem evidence and DNA from under Jeffrey’s fingernails linked Gibson to the July scene.
- Indictment charged Gibson with counts tied to May (burglary, conspiracy, assault) and July (felony murder—felony murder during an attempted robbery—conspiracy, discharging a firearm); some firearm counts later dismissed; jury convicted on remaining counts and Superior Court imposed consecutive life sentences plus additional years.
- On appeal Gibson argued (1) the trial justice omitted a required robbery-specific-intent jury instruction, and (2) the trial justice erred denying his Rule 29 (judgment of acquittal) and Rule 33 (new trial) motions. The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Gibson) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial justice erred by omitting a robbery-specific-intent jury instruction | Omission was not reversible because the charged offenses either do not require the robbery-specific-intent instruction (attempt, conspiracy) or the jury was otherwise instructed on the requisite mental states | Omission deprived jury of guidance on the essential robbery element (specific intent to permanently deprive), affecting burglary, assault with intent to rob, felony murder (predicate robbery), and conspiracy | No reversible error. Instructions, read as a whole, adequately covered the law: specific-intent instruction unnecessary for burglary (intent assessed at entry), excluded from assault-with-intent (lesser offense), unnecessary for felony murder here because the predicate was attempted robbery (different intent, and attempt instruction was given), and conspiracy is a distinct offense that does not require proving every element of the underlying substantive crime |
| Whether the trial justice erred in denying Gibson’s motion for judgment of acquittal as to felony murder and conspiracy | Evidence (DNA links, witness sightings, Gibson’s knowledge of victim’s cash/marijuana, similarities to May incident) sufficiently supported inferences of attempted robbery and conspiracy | Evidence was speculative and insufficient to prove intent to rob or an agreement to rob on July 28 | Denial affirmed. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, reasonable jurors could infer attempted robbery and a conspiracy; circumstantial evidence sufficed |
| Whether the trial justice erred in denying Gibson’s motion for a new trial on the July-related counts | (Implicit) The evidence weight supported convictions | Evidence was meager; jury verdict against weight of evidence | Denial affirmed. Trial justice performed independent (13th juror) review, assessed witness credibility and weight of evidence, and did not overlook or misconceive material evidence |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Robalewski, 418 A.2d 817 (R.I. 1980) (specific-intent element of robbery—permanent deprivation—must be instructed when robbery is the principal charge)
- State v. Hazard, 745 A.2d 748 (R.I. 2000) (reaffirming specific-intent element of robbery)
- State v. Latraverse, 443 A.2d 890 (R.I. 1982) (adopting Model Penal Code approach to criminal attempt)
- State v. LaPlume, 375 A.2d 938 (R.I. 1977) (conspiracy is a separate offense distinct from the substantive crime)
- State v. Brown, 549 A.2d 1373 (R.I. 1988) (distinguishing robbery from assault with intent to rob; burden of proof principles)
- State v. Oliveira, 882 A.2d 1097 (R.I. 2005) (felony murder requires proof of elements of the predicate felony or attempt)
- Lopes v. State, 111 A.3d 344 (R.I. 2015) (burglary requires felonious intent at the time of breaking and entering)
- State v. Lopez, 45 A.3d 1 (R.I. 2012) (jury instructions reviewed in their entirety; court will affirm if instructions adequately cover the law)
