State v. Jose Luis Villavicencio, 362 P.3d 1

In 2005 Villavicencio entered a binding plea: two methamphetamine possession felonies with an aggregate 10-year sentence (1.5 years determinate + 3.5 years indeterminate per count) and a 10-year probation term if he successfully completed retained jurisdiction.
The district court retained jurisdiction, Villavicencio completed the rider, and at the 2006 review the court (mistakenly) placed him on two concurrent 10-year probation terms even though statutory maximum probation for the offenses is seven years.
In 2013 the State sought to revoke probation for alleged violations; Villavicencio instead moved under I.C.R. 35(a) to correct illegal sentences, arguing the 10-year probation terms were void and should be reduced to seven years, which would extinguish probation before the alleged violations.
The State argued the plea agreement required an aggregate 10-year probation (consecutive five-year terms), that Villavicencio had waived objections, and the court could reform the judgment to reflect the plea.
The district court granted Villavicencio’s Rule 35(a) motion but reduced the probation to concurrent seven-year terms (treating only the minimal cure as authorized), effectively ending probation before the alleged violations; the State appealed.

Issue	State's Argument	Villavicencio's Argument	Held
Whether the court had jurisdiction to decide the Rule 35(a) motion before ruling on probation revocation	Court should correct illegal sentence to reflect plea (consecutive terms aggregating 10 years); jurisdiction exists to amend judgment	Once lawful probation elapsed (seven years), court lacked jurisdiction to revoke; Rule 35(a) relief limited	Court may decide Rule 35(a) motion first; it has jurisdiction to amend an illegal sentence and then determine revocation based on amended judgment
Scope of authority under I.C.R. 35(a) to correct an illegal sentence	Court may restructure probation to effectuate plea (convert to consecutive 5-year terms aggregating 10) without increasing aggregate punishment	Court limited to curing illegality by reducing to lawful concurrent seven-year terms only	Rule 35(a) does not permit increasing aggregate punishment beyond what is necessary to correct illegality; the court erred by believing it could only impose minimal cure and must reconsider with full discretion (including restructuring to consecutive five-year terms)

State v. Kesling, 155 Idaho 673 (court lacks jurisdiction to revoke probation after lawful term elapsed)
State v. Lindquist, 101 Idaho 688 (trial court may resentence to punishment authorized at time of offense when statutory sentencing structure changed)
State v. Hoisington, 105 Idaho 660 (similar to Lindquist; court may impose lawful sentence under statutes in effect when offense occurred)
State v. Mendenhall, 106 Idaho 388 (court correcting an illegal sentence may not increase aggregate penalty beyond what is necessary to cure illegality)
State v. Steelsmith, 153 Idaho 577 (I.C.R. 35(a) correction limited to what is necessary to cure illegality; cannot add unauthorized punishment)
State v. Money, 109 Idaho 757 (when correcting illegality, court must consider entire sentence; broad language about resentence authority is dicta)
State v. Edghill, 155 Idaho 846 (upon excising illegal portion of a sentence, court should reconsider entire sanction parameters)
State v. Horejs, 143 Idaho 260 (discusses consecutive versus concurrent sentencing implications)