State v. Jones (Slip Opinion), 2019 Ohio 5159

Joseph Jones unleashed his dog while walking; an encounter with a stray and with Alyssa Rushing resulted in Rushing and her dog suffering bite wounds; parties disputed whether Jones’s dog bit Rushing or only the stray attacked.
Jones was charged under R.C. 955.22(D) for failing to confine a "dangerous dog" (removing a dog’s leash in public) and was convicted in municipal court; sentence suspended with probation and fines.
On appeal the First District reversed, holding a prior designation of a dog as "dangerous" under R.C. 955.222 is a prerequisite to prosecution under R.C. 955.22(D).
The state certified a conflict with the Fifth District (which had allowed dangerousness to be proven at trial without a prior designation) and the Ohio Supreme Court accepted the certified question.
The Supreme Court held that prior designation is not a prerequisite; the state may prove dangerousness at trial based on the dog’s prior conduct, but here the state failed to present sufficient evidence that Jones’s dog had committed prior acts making it a "dangerous dog," so the conviction was reversed/affirmed on that ground.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a prior formal designation under R.C. 955.222 is required before prosecuting an owner under R.C. 955.22(D)	State: No; dangerousness is an element that can be proved at trial by evidence of prior conduct.	Jones: Yes; due process and notice require formal prior designation via R.C. 955.222 (or prior judicial finding).	Court: No prior designation required; the state may prosecute and prove dangerousness at trial if it can show prior acts meeting R.C. 955.11(A)(1)(a).
Whether the state presented sufficient evidence that Jones's dog was a "dangerous dog" before the charged incident	State: Facebook post and Jones’s testimony about protection training supported inference of prior dangerous acts.	Jones: No proof of prior unprovoked injury, killing of another dog, or three prior violations under R.C. 955.22(C).	Court: Insufficient evidence that the dog had previously done any act meeting the statutory definition of "dangerous dog;" conviction cannot stand.

State v. Cowan, 814 N.E.2d 846 (Ohio 2004) (unilateral administrative designation of a dog as vicious/dangerous without meaningful pre-deprivation process violated due process)
State v. Jenks, 574 N.E.2d 492 (Ohio 1991) (standard for sufficiency of the evidence review)
State v. Smith, 818 N.E.2d 283 (Ohio 2004) (use of perfect tense indicates prior occurrence relevant to statutory specification)
United Tel. Co. of Ohio v. Limbach, 643 N.E.2d 1129 (Ohio 1994) (interpret statutes to give effect to the whole statutory scheme)
Akron v. Rowland, 618 N.E.2d 138 (Ohio 1993) (due process requires penal statutes be reasonably clear and definite)