State v. Jones
298 Kan. 324
Kan.2013Background
- On July 2, 2009, Austin N. Jones shot and killed Emmanuel Delatorre and Jesus M. Esparza in the parking lot of his apartment complex; autopsies showed both were shot in the back/rear of the head.
- Jones admitted firing the shots, fled the scene, crashed his truck, and was captured after running from police.
- Jones claimed self‑defense at trial; the jury convicted him of two counts of first‑degree murder, one aggravated assault, and one count of illegal firearm possession; he received two hard 25‑to‑life sentences.
- On appeal Jones first argued he was immune from prosecution under Kansas’ Stand‑Your‑Ground statute (K.S.A. 21‑3219), though he never raised that statute in the district court.
- As an alternative, Jones argued prosecutorial misconduct in closing (alleged instant premeditation argument, inflammatory appeals to passion/sympathy, and a misstatement about unanimity for lesser offenses).
- The Kansas Supreme Court considered statutory interpretation, preservation, and harmless‑error doctrines and affirmed the convictions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Jones) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether K.S.A. 21‑3219 immunity may be invoked for the first time on appeal | Immunity cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; statute is an affirmative defense subject to timely assertion | Jones: self‑defense claim at trial sufficed to invoke K.S.A. 21‑3219 immunity; statute’s purpose requires broad protection from prosecution | Immunity must be asserted before trial or via a pretrial dispositive plea; too late on appeal |
| Burden/procedure for immunity claim | If timely raised, State must show probable cause that force was not justified | Jones: (if reached) he met self‑defense facts and should be immune | If timely invoked, probable cause standard applies and State bears burden (per Ultreras) |
| Whether prosecutors implied premeditation can be instantaneous (misconduct) | Comments did not reduce premeditation to an instant and were within prosecutorial latitude | Remarks (trigger metaphors) effectively equated pulling trigger with instantaneous premeditation | No misconduct: in context prosecutors repeatedly defined premeditation as requiring prior thought and did not diminish it to an instant |
| Whether prosecutor misstated law re: unanimity for lesser included offenses (misconduct) | Misstatement not gross/flagrant and harmless given record strength | Prosecutor told jurors all must agree there is no premeditation before considering lesser offenses (error) | Statement was legally incorrect but harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given overwhelming evidence; no new trial |
Key Cases Cited
- McCracken v. Kohl, 286 Kan. 1114 (Kan. 2008) (explains prerequisite that use of force be justified under K.S.A. 21‑3211–3213 to invoke K.S.A. 21‑3219)
- State v. Ultreras, 296 Kan. 828 (Kan. 2013) (if immunity raised pretrial, probable cause standard applies and State must show force was not justified)
- McCormick v. Board of Shawnee County Comm’rs, 272 Kan. 627 (Kan. 2001) (qualified‑immunity principles and need to resolve immunity at earliest stage)
- State v. Hall, 292 Kan. 841 (Kan. 2011) (prosecutorial statements that premeditation can occur instantly can be reversible error)
- State v. Tosh, 278 Kan. 83 (Kan. 2004) (factors for determining whether prosecutorial misconduct requires new trial)
- State v. Bridges, 297 Kan. 989 (Kan. 2013) (harmlessness standards and interplay between constitutional and statutory harmless error analyses)
- State v. Hurt, 278 Kan. 676 (Kan. 2004) (unanimity not required for acquittal on greater offense before considering lesser included offenses)