State v. Jones, 306 P.3d 105

Jones was convicted after a bench trial of two counts of child abuse and one count of felony murder arising from the death of her ten-month-old child.
The trial court sentenced Count 2 to a term consecutive to Counts 1 and 3, based on § 13-705(M) because Counts 2 and 3 were dangerous crimes against children.
Counts 2 and 3 arose from the same act or conduct, creating a potential conflict between § 13-116 (concurrency) and § 13-705(M) (consecutive sentences for dangerous crimes against children).
Jones appealed, challenging the sentences as potentially violating § 13-116 and arguing the consecutive-imposition requirement should apply.
The Arizona Court of Appeals concluded § 13-116 controls and requires concurrent sentences for Counts 2 and 3 because they derive from the same conduct, despite § 13-705(M)’s general rule.
The court affirmed the convictions but ordered the Count 2 sentence modified to run concurrently with the felony murder sentence.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Conformance of sentences for Counts 2 and 3	Jones contends § 13-705(M) requires consecutiveness for dangerous crimes against children.	Jones argues the same-conduct rule in § 13-116 requires concurrency for Counts 2 and 3.	Concurrent sentences required under § 13-116 for same-conduct counts.
Hierarchy of conflicting sentencing statutes	Jones asserts § 13-705(M) should control as the more specific, modern provision.	State contends § 13-705(M) creates an exception to concurrency for certain crimes.	§ 13-116 paramount; Amoldi’s framework applied to harmonize statutes, yielding concurrency.

State v. Arnoldi, 176 Ariz. 236 (App. 1993) (concurrency favored when same act; §13-116 controlling over §13-705(M))
State v. McDonagh, 232 Ariz. 247 (App. 2013) (§13-116 paramount in sentencing scheme)
State v. Diaz, 224 Ariz. 322 (App. 2010) (harmonization of conflicting sentencing statutes)
DeVries v. State, 221 Ariz. 201 (App. 2009) (interpretation and harmonization of sentencing statutes)
Weitekamp v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 147 Ariz. 274 (App. 1985) (statutory interpretation principles; avoid superfluous language)
Galloway v. Vanderpool, 205 Ariz. 252 (2003) (legislative intent presumed when statutes amended yet not modified in meaning)
Estate of McGill ex rel. McGill v. Albrecht, 203 Ariz. 525 (2002) (presumption of legislative intent in statutory interpretation)
Padilla v. Indus. Comm’n, 113 Ariz. 104 (1976) (presumption that what the Legislature means, it will say)
State v. Hamblin, 217 Ariz. 481 (App. 2008) (principles of legislative interpretation and consistency)