State v. JonesÂ, 256 N.C. App. 266

On March 27, 2013 Small Luxuries (a High Point jewelry store) was robbed by three armed men; the owner suffered serious injuries. Some stolen jewelry was recovered by police.
A Biscuitville employee and bank records tied a person eating at Biscuitville that morning to a transaction on Robert Levon Jones’s bank account; a K-9 tracked jewelry trail between the store and Biscuitville.
On March 27, 2013 a customer (receipt showing Jones’s driver’s license and signature) pawned coins/jewelry at Got Gold; the pawn receipt was seized and identified by police.
Jones was acquitted in Forsyth County of obtaining property by false pretenses based on pawning the jewelry, but later indicted in Guilford County for robbery with a dangerous weapon and felony assault; at the Guilford trial the pawn receipt was admitted over Jones’s objection.
A Guilford jury convicted Jones of robbery with a dangerous weapon and misdemeanor assault inflicting serious injury; Jones appealed, arguing the pawn receipt’s admission was barred by collateral estoppel/double jeopardy because of his prior acquittal.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the pawnshop receipt (showing Jones pawning stolen jewelry) was inadmissible under collateral estoppel/double jeopardy because Jones had been acquitted of obtaining property by false pretenses in an earlier trial	The State argued the receipt was admissible as circumstantial evidence of recent possession and not barred by collateral estoppel; any prior acquittal did not decide the issue of recent possession necessary for robbery	Jones argued his prior acquittal meant the State was collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue (i.e., that he possessed/pawned the stolen items), so admission of the receipt violated double jeopardy/collateral estoppel principles	The court held the pawn receipt was admissible to show recent possession. Jones’s prior acquittal of obtaining property by false pretenses did not necessarily resolve the separate factual issue of recent possession, so collateral estoppel/double jeopardy did not bar admission; no reversible error was shown

Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (doctrine of collateral estoppel as part of Double Jeopardy analysis)
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (incorporation of Double Jeopardy protection against the States)
Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342 (limits on using evidence of offenses for which defendant was previously acquitted; focus on whether prior issue was necessarily decided)
State v. Scott, 331 N.C. 39 (evidence of an offense for which defendant was acquitted may be inadmissible under Rule 403 if its probative value depends on commission of the acquitted offense)
State v. Bell, 164 N.C. App. 83 (application of Dowling and inquiry whether conviction requires jury to decide an issue the prior jury decided in defendant’s favor)
State v. Edwards, 310 N.C. 142 (discussion of collateral estoppel and when prior acquittals bar later litigation of issues)
State v. Mohamed, 205 N.C. App. 470 (doctrine of recent possession and its elements)