State v. Jones, 297 Neb. 557

Background

In 1999 Daniel Lee Jones (born Nov. 7, 1981) pled no contest to first-degree murder for a premeditated stabbing that occurred Sept. 29, 1998, when he was 16; he was originally sentenced to life imprisonment.
After Miller v. Alabama and this court’s retroactivity ruling in State v. Mantich, Jones moved for postconviction relief; his life sentence was vacated in 2015 and he was granted resentencing.
At an August 2016 mitigation hearing, Jones presented expert testimony on adolescent brain development, a psychological evaluation concluding low risk of future violence, family testimony describing a deprived and unstable childhood, and prison behavior indicating compliance.
The district court expressly considered age, mentality, background, motive, severity of the offense, the mitigation hearing evidence, § 28-105.02 factors, and Department of Corrections records.
The court found the crime to be a heinous, premeditated murder in which Jones planned and executed the killing and concealed evidence, and resentenced him to 80 years to life with parole eligibility at age 56.
Jones appealed, arguing the sentence was a de facto life without parole, the court failed to make required age-related findings, and the sentence was disproportionate/cruel and unusual.

Issues

Issue	Jones' Argument	State's Argument	Held
Whether 80-to-life with parole at 56 is a de facto life-without-parole in violation of the Eighth Amendment	The sentence is functionally equivalent to life without parole because life expectancy may prevent meaningful opportunity for release; geriatric parole is not meaningful	The court considered release prospects and intended to give hope; parole eligibility at a set age satisfies Miller’s meaningful opportunity requirement	Not unconstitutional; parole eligibility at 56 provides a meaningful opportunity for release (affirmed)
Whether the sentencing court violated due process by failing to make specific age-related factual findings	Court was required to make explicit findings about youth-related characteristics or "irreparable corruption"	Miller does not require specific written findings where sentence includes parole; court’s stated consideration of statutory and customary factors suffices	No due process violation; specific findings not required when sentence includes parole (affirmed)
Whether the sentence is unconstitutionally disproportionate	Jones argued his youth, maturation, and rehabilitation make the sentence excessive compared to other juveniles resentenced under Miller	The seriousness, premeditation, execution, and concealment supported a severe sentence; proportionality is narrow and forbids only grossly disproportionate sentences	Sentence not grossly disproportionate; appropriate given the calculated, violent nature of the crime (affirmed)
Whether the district court abused discretion in resentencing within statutory limits	The sentence effectively denies meaningful release and ignores mitigating youth factors	The court considered statutory mitigation factors, case law, expert testimony, and prison records before imposing a sentence within statutory bounds	No abuse of discretion; sentencing court acted within authority and considered required factors (affirmed)

Key Cases Cited

Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (mandatory life without parole for juveniles violates the Eighth Amendment; individualized youth-based consideration required)
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016) (Miller applies retroactively; juveniles must have meaningful opportunity for release)
State v. Mantich, 287 Neb. 320 (2014) (Nebraska held Miller retroactive and applicable on collateral review)
State v. Smith, 295 Neb. 957 (2017) (life expectancy is relevant but not dispositive to meaningful opportunity analysis)
State v. Garza, 295 Neb. 434 (2016) (no requirement for explicit finding of "irreparable corruption" when sentence includes parole)
State v. Nollen, 296 Neb. 94 (2017) (discusses Eighth Amendment review as a question of law)