State v. Jones, 297 Neb. 557

Background

In 1999, Daniel Lee Jones (born Nov. 7, 1981) pled no contest to first-degree murder for a premeditated stabbing that occurred Sept. 29, 1998; he was 16 at the time and originally sentenced to life imprisonment.
After Miller v. Alabama and Nebraska precedent recognizing Miller’s retroactivity, Jones’s life sentence was vacated in 2015 and he was granted resentencing.
At an August 2016 mitigation hearing, Jones presented expert testimony on adolescent brain development, a clinical evaluation showing maturation and low risk of future violence, family testimony about a troubled upbringing, and prison conduct evidence.
The district court expressly considered Jones’s age at the time of the offense, mental and social background, statutory mitigating factors in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-105.02(2), the violent and premeditated nature of the crime, and prison records.
On Oct. 3, 2016, Jones was resentenced to 80 years to life with credit for time served and parole eligibility at age 56. Jones appealed, arguing the sentence was effectively life without parole, that the court failed to make required age-related findings, and that the sentence was disproportionate.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Jones)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Whether 80-to-life with parole at 56 is a de facto life-without-parole in violation of the Eighth Amendment	The term-to-parole age and life-expectancy data make parole eligibility illusory; the sentence denies a meaningful opportunity for release	Parole eligibility, consideration of release prospects, and precedent show geriatric parole can satisfy Miller/Montgomery	Court held parole eligibility at 56 is not unconstitutional; not a de facto life without parole
Whether the court violated due process by failing to make specific age-related factual findings (e.g., "irreparable corruption")	Court should be required to make explicit findings about juvenile characteristics and whether offender is beyond rehabilitation	Miller did not mandate formal fact-finding when sentence includes parole; court stated it considered statutory and Miller factors	Court held no requirement to make specific findings where sentence includes possibility of parole; due process satisfied by record of consideration
Whether the sentence is unconstitutionally disproportionate under the Eighth Amendment	Jones argued his youth and demonstrated rehabilitation make an 80-year minimum excessive and disproportionate	State relied on the heinous, premeditated nature of the offense and Jones’s active role and concealment to justify severe sentence	Court held sentence not grossly disproportionate given the calculated, violent nature of the crime and sentencing court’s consideration of mitigating evidence
Whether sentencing court abused discretion or failed to follow § 28-105.02 mitigation framework	Jones claimed inadequate individualized consideration of youth factors and rehabilitation	State showed court explicitly considered § 28-105.02 factors, case law, expert evidence, and prison records	Court found no abuse of discretion; sentencing court adhered to Miller, Montgomery, and § 28-105.02

Key Cases Cited

Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (holding mandatory life without parole for juvenile homicide offenders violates the Eighth Amendment)
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (holding Miller decision applies retroactively and requiring individualized sentencing consideration)
State v. Mantich, 287 Neb. 320 (Nebraska Supreme Court applying Miller retroactively and describing required individualized consideration)
State v. Smith, 295 Neb. 957 (rejecting argument that geriatric parole is per se unconstitutional; meaningful opportunity to obtain release focus)
State v. Garza, 295 Neb. 434 (addressing requirement for specific findings when sentence includes parole)
State v. Nollen, 296 Neb. 94 (reviewing Eighth Amendment sentencing questions independently)