State v. Jones, 297 Neb. 557

Background

In 1999 Daniel Lee Jones (born Nov. 7, 1981) pled no contest to first-degree murder for a premeditated stabbing that occurred Sept. 29, 1998, when he was 16; he was initially sentenced to life imprisonment.
Jones’s original sentence was vacated after Miller v. Alabama and this court’s retroactivity decision in State v. Mantich; he was granted resentencing in 2015.
At the 2016 mitigation/resentencing hearing Jones presented expert testimony on adolescent development, family background witnesses, prison behavior records, and a psychological evaluation attesting low risk of future violence.
The district court considered statutory and customary sentencing factors (including Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-105.02(2)), the violent and premeditated nature of the crime, and Jones’s institutional record.
The court resentenced Jones to 80 years to life with credit for time served and parole eligibility at age 56. Jones appealed, arguing the sentence is a de facto life term, that the court failed to make required age-related findings, and that the sentence is disproportionate.

Issues

Issue	Jones' Argument	State's Argument	Held
Whether an 80-to-life term with parole eligibility at 56 is a de facto life-without-parole violating the Eighth Amendment	The term is functionally equivalent to life without parole (given life expectancy and advanced parole age), denying meaningful opportunity for release	Parole eligibility, and the sentencing court’s consideration of youth, provide a meaningful opportunity; life expectancy alone is not dispositive	Court rejected Jones’ claim; parole eligibility at 56 is constitutional and not necessarily a de facto LWOP
Whether the sentencing court violated due process by failing to make specific findings about age-related characteristics (e.g., "irreparable corruption")	The court should make explicit findings that Jones is beyond rehabilitation or otherwise address each Miller/Montgomery consideration	No categorical finding requirement when sentence includes parole; the court need only consider statutory and Miller factors, which it did	Court held no error—specific factual findings (e.g., "irreparable corruption") are not required when parole remains possible
Whether the sentence is unconstitutionally disproportionate under the Eighth Amendment	Jones emphasized youth, rehabilitation, and comparably lesser resentences of other juveniles to argue his 80-to-life is excessive	The crime was planned, executed, violent, and followed by concealment and lying; severity is justified by offense and offender	Court held the sentence is not grossly disproportionate given the crime’s severity and Jones’ role
Whether the sentencing court abused discretion or failed to consider required factors (statutory and Miller)	Jones argued the court failed to adequately account for mitigating evidence of youth and maturation	Sentencing order and hearing record show consideration of age, mental health, family background, prison behavior, and § 28-105.02 factors	Court found no abuse of discretion; the record shows the court considered the required factors

Key Cases Cited

Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (mandatory LWOP for juveniles convicted of homicide violates the Eighth Amendment and requires individualized consideration)
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016) (Miller applies retroactively; juveniles must have sentencing consideration reflecting diminished culpability and capacity for change)
State v. Mantich, 287 Neb. 320 (2014) (Nebraska: Miller applies retroactively on collateral review)
State v. Smith, 295 Neb. 957 (2017) (life expectancy is one consideration but not dispositive for meaningful-opportunity analysis)
State v. Garza, 295 Neb. 434 (2016) (no requirement for explicit "irreparable corruption" finding when parole is possible)
State v. Nollen, 296 Neb. 94 (2017) (discussing Eighth Amendment sentencing review principles)
State v. Jones, 274 Neb. 271 (2007) (prior direct appeal affirming conviction)