State v. Jones
297 Neb. 557
| Neb. | 2017Background
- In 1999 Daniel Lee Jones (born Nov. 7, 1981) pled no contest to first-degree murder for a premeditated stabbing that occurred Sept. 29, 1998; he was 16 at the time and originally sentenced to life in prison.
- After Miller v. Alabama and Nebraska precedent applying it retroactively (Mantich), Jones moved for postconviction relief; his life sentence was vacated in 2015 and the case set for resentencing.
- At an August 2016 mitigation hearing, Jones presented expert testimony on adolescent development, a psychologist’s evaluation (opining low risk of future violence), family testimony describing a difficult childhood, and prison conduct records showing good behavior.
- The district court expressly considered Jones’ age, mentality, background, offense severity, mitigation evidence, § 28-105.02 factors, and Department of Corrections records, concluding the crime was planned and brutal but that Jones should retain hope of release.
- On Oct. 3, 2016, Jones was resentenced to 80 years to life with parole eligibility at age 56; he appealed claiming the sentence was effectively life without parole, that the court failed to make required age-specific findings, and that the sentence was disproportionate.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Jones) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether 80-to-life with parole at 56 is a de facto life-without-parole sentence | Sentence functionally equals life without parole (geriatric parole) and denies meaningful opportunity for release | Parole eligibility, sentencing intent to allow hope of release, and precedent show parole at 56 is constitutionally permissible | Court: Not unconstitutional; parole eligibility at 56 provides a meaningful opportunity for release (citing Smith) |
| Whether the court violated due process by failing to make specific age-related factual findings | Court should make explicit findings about juvenile characteristics (e.g., "irreparable corruption" vs transient immaturity) | No categorical requirement to make such specific findings when sentence includes parole; court’s stated consideration of factors suffices | Court: No error; specific findings not required here; consideration of § 28-105.02 factors and mitigation satisfied due process and Miller/Montgomery |
| Whether the sentence is cruel and unusual / disproportionate under the Eighth Amendment | Youth and demonstrated maturation make long sentence disproportionate; compared unfavorably to other resentencings | Offense was planned, brutal, involved concealment; severity warranted lengthy sentence | Court: Sentence is not grossly disproportionate; Eighth Amendment narrow-proportionality principle not violated |
| Whether sentencing complied with Nebraska’s juvenile sentencing statute (§ 28-105.02) and Miller/Montgomery | Argues statute and precedents require individualized consideration that he contends was inadequate | Court complied: considered statutory mitigating factors, mitigation evidence, and case law | Court: Sentencing adhered to § 28-105.02 and Miller/Montgomery; affirmed sentence |
Key Cases Cited
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (U.S. 2012) (mandatory life without parole for juveniles violates the Eighth Amendment; individualized sentencing required)
- Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (U.S. 2016) (Miller rule applies retroactively; juveniles must receive individualized consideration)
- State v. Mantich, 287 Neb. 320 (Neb. 2014) (applied Miller retroactively in Nebraska)
- State v. Smith, 295 Neb. 957 (Neb. 2017) (parole eligibility timing and life expectancy considerations do not alone render a sentence unconstitutional)
- State v. Garza, 295 Neb. 434 (Neb. 2016) (no requirement of specific finding of "irreparable corruption" where sentence allows parole)