State v. Jones
297 Neb. 557
| Neb. | 2017Background
- Daniel Lee Jones stabbed and helped kill Scott Catenacci in Sept. 1998; Jones was 16 at the time. He pled no contest to first-degree murder in 1999 and received life imprisonment.
- Jones’s direct appeal was ultimately resolved against him in 2007, but after Miller v. Alabama, he moved for postconviction relief arguing mandatory life sentences for juveniles are unconstitutional; his life sentence was vacated in 2015.
- Nebraska statute § 28-105.02 (post-Miller) caps juvenile Class IA sentences between 40 years and life and prescribes mitigating factors courts must consider.
- At an August 2016 mitigation/resentencing hearing, Jones presented expert testimony about adolescent brain development, family background, prison behavior showing rehabilitation, and a mental-health evaluation finding low risk of future violence.
- The district court resentenced Jones to 80 years to life with parole eligibility at age 56, stating it had considered Jones’s youth, the § 28-105.02 factors, mitigation evidence, and the violent, premeditated nature of the offense.
- Jones appealed, arguing the sentence is (1) a de facto life-without-parole, (2) unconstitutional due process for lack of specific age-related findings, and (3) disproportional under the Eighth Amendment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Jones) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether 80-to-life with parole eligibility at 56 is a de facto LWOP violating Miller/Eighth Amendment | The term effectively denies a meaningful opportunity for release given life expectancy and results in "geriatric parole." | The court considered release prospects and intended to leave hope for release; parole eligibility satisfies Miller’s meaningful-opportunity requirement. | Court: Not unconstitutional; parole eligibility at 56 is a meaningful opportunity for release. |
| Whether the court violated due process by failing to make specific findings about age-related characteristics | Court needed explicit fact findings (e.g., "irreparable corruption") to show it considered juvenile characteristics. | No such formalized finding is required when sentence allows parole; stating consideration of § 28-105.02 factors suffices. | Court: No due-process error; explicit "irreparable corruption" finding not required absent LWOP. |
| Whether the sentence is Eighth Amendment–disproportionate punishment | Jones: His youth and rehabilitation make the sentence grossly disproportionate; his case reflects transient immaturity. | State: Crime was premeditated, brutal, and involved planning and concealment; severity warranted lengthy sentence. | Court: Sentence not grossly disproportionate; evidence showed calculated, violent conduct, so sentence is constitutional. |
| Whether sentencing court adequately applied Miller and Nebraska statutory mitigation framework | Jones: Court failed to properly weigh age-related mitigating evidence and comparative sentences. | Court: Considered Miller, Montgomery, § 28-105.02, mitigation evidence, and DOC records in reaching calibrated sentence. | Court: Sentencing complied with Miller/Montgomery and § 28-105.02; no abuse of discretion. |
Key Cases Cited
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (mandatory life without parole for juveniles violates the Eighth Amendment; individualized consideration required)
- Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016) (Miller rules apply retroactively and require meaningful opportunity for release)
- State v. Mantich, 287 Neb. 320 (2014) (applies Miller retroactively in Nebraska and discusses juvenile sentencing requirements)
- State v. Smith, 295 Neb. 957 (2017) (rejects life-expectancy alone as dispositive; meaningful opportunity focuses on realistic chance for release)
- State v. Garza, 295 Neb. 434 (2016) (no requirement to make explicit "irreparable corruption" findings when sentence allows parole)
- State v. Nollen, 296 Neb. 94 (2017) (Eighth Amendment sentencing questions are legal issues reviewed de novo)