State v. Jones
297 Neb. 557
| Neb. | 2017Background
- In 1998, 16-year-old Daniel Lee Jones participated in a premeditated stabbing that killed Scott Catenacci; Jones pled no contest to first degree murder and was sentenced to life in 1999.
- After Miller v. Alabama and this court’s retroactivity ruling in State v. Mantich, Jones’s life sentence (imposed when he was a juvenile) was vacated and he was granted resentencing in 2015.
- At the 2016 mitigation/resentencing hearing Jones presented expert testimony on adolescent brain development, family background evidence, prison behavior records, and a psychological evaluation indicating low risk of future violence.
- The district court expressly considered Jones’s age at offense, mentality, background, motivation, offense severity, mitigation hearing evidence, and factors listed in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-105.02(2).
- The court resentenced Jones to 80 years to life with credit for time served and statutory parole eligibility at age 56; Jones appealed, arguing the sentence was (1) a de facto life without parole, (2) unconstitutional for lack of specific age-related findings, and (3) disproportionate/excessive.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether 80-to-life is a de facto life without parole (Eighth Amendment) | Jones: parole eligibility at 56 effectively denies meaningful opportunity for release given life expectancy; constitutes cruel and unusual punishment | State: parole eligibility, consideration of release, and sentencing within statutory scheme satisfies Miller and provides meaningful opportunity | Court: Not unconstitutional; parole eligibility at 56 and court’s statements gave a meaningful opportunity for release; rejected life-exempt claim |
| Whether sentencing court violated due process by not making explicit findings about age-related characteristics | Jones: court failed to make specific findings (e.g., irreparable corruption vs. transient immaturity) required by Miller/Montgomery | State: no categorical fact-finding required where sentence retains parole possibility; court considered statutory and customary factors | Court: No error; specific findings unnecessary absent a life-without-parole sentence and the record shows consideration of § 28-105.02 factors |
| Whether the sentence is disproportional to the offender/offense (Eighth Amendment) | Jones: his youth, maturation, and rehabilitation warrant lesser sentence; the punishment should be graduated and proportioned | State: crime was planned, brutal, and involved concealment; severity is justified by facts | Court: Sentence not grossly disproportionate; facts support a severe sentence and court properly weighed youth and culpability |
| Whether trial court abused discretion / imposed excessive sentence | Jones: sentence excessive given mitigation evidence and improvements | State: sentencing within statutory limits and supported by record and statutory factors | Court: No abuse of discretion; sentence within statutory limits and constitutionally permissible |
Key Cases Cited
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (mandatory life without parole for juveniles violates the Eighth Amendment; individualized sentencing required)
- Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016) (Miller rule applies retroactively; juveniles must have meaningful opportunity for release)
- State v. Mantich, 287 Neb. 320 (2014) (applied Miller retroactively in Nebraska; grounds for resentencing juveniles previously given mandatory life)
- State v. Smith, 295 Neb. 957 (2017) (life expectancy is relevant but not dispositive to meaningful-opportunity analysis)
- State v. Garza, 295 Neb. 434 (2016) (no requirement for specific findings of irreparable corruption when sentence allows parole)
- State v. Nollen, 296 Neb. 94 (2017) (Eighth Amendment review of sentencing is a question of law)
