State v. Jones, 297 Neb. 557

Background

In 1998, when he was 16, Daniel Lee Jones participated in the premeditated stabbing death of Scott Catenacci; Jones pled no contest to first‑degree murder and received life imprisonment in 1999.
Jones’s direct appeal process was prolonged; his conviction and original sentence were previously affirmed by this court.
After Miller v. Alabama and this court’s retroactivity ruling in State v. Mantich, Jones moved for postconviction relief; his life sentence was vacated in 2015 and he was resentenced.
At the 2016 mitigation/resentencing hearing Jones presented expert testimony on adolescent brain development, a psychological evaluation asserting low future-violence risk, family testimony about a deprived upbringing, and prison records showing compliance.
The district court considered statutory juvenile‑sentencing factors, the brutality and premeditation of the murder, and Jones’s institutional behavior, and resentenced him to 80 years to life with parole eligibility at age 56.
Jones appealed, arguing the sentence was effectively life without parole (cruel and unusual), that the court failed to make required age‑related findings, and that the sentence was disproportionate.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether 80‑to‑life with parole at 56 is a de facto life‑without‑parole (Eighth Amendment)	Jones: parole at 56 may never be a meaningful opportunity for release given life expectancy; effectively LWOP	State: parole eligibility, consideration of youth, and sentencing discretion satisfy Miller/Montgomery	Court: Not unconstitutional; parole eligibility provides a meaningful opportunity for release and district court considered release prospects
Whether sentencing court violated due process by failing to make specific findings about age‑related characteristics	Jones: court needed explicit findings showing consideration of juvenile characteristics and whether he is irreparably corrupted	State: no such formalized factfinding is required when sentence allows parole; statute and record suffice	Court: No error; specific "irreparable corruption" finding unnecessary where sentence is not LWOP and §28‑105.02 factors were considered
Whether sentence was disproportionate under the Eighth Amendment	Jones: youth and rehabilitation justify a lesser sentence; comparative sentences show disparity	State: crime was planned, violent, and followed by concealment; severity justified	Court: Sentence not grossly disproportionate given calculated, brutal nature of offense and offender’s role
Whether trial court abused discretion in resentencing	Jones: sentence excessive given mitigation evidence	State: court followed statutory factors and precedent	Court: No abuse of discretion; sentencing within statutory limits and properly considered mitigation and aggravation

Key Cases Cited

Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (ban on mandatory LWOP for juveniles; individualized sentencing required)
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (Miller rules apply retroactively; juveniles must have meaningful opportunity for release)
State v. Mantich, 287 Neb. 320 (Nebraska: Miller applies retroactively on collateral review)
State v. Garza, 295 Neb. 434 (no requirement of explicit factfinding of "irreparable corruption" when sentence permits parole)
State v. Smith, 295 Neb. 957 (parole‑eligibility timing and life‑expectancy arguments do not automatically render a sentence unconstitutional)