State v. Jones
297 Neb. 557
Neb.2017Background
- Daniel Lee Jones stabbed and helped plan the premeditated murder of Scott Catenacci in 1998 when Jones was 16; Jones pled no contest to first-degree murder and received life imprisonment in 1999.
- After Miller v. Alabama, Jones moved for postconviction relief; in 2015 the district court vacated his life sentence and ordered resentencing.
- At the 2016 mitigation/resentencing hearing Jones presented expert testimony on adolescent brain development, a psychological evaluation concluding low risk of future violence, family-history testimony, and prison conduct records.
- The district court considered statutory and common sentencing factors, § 28-105.02 mitigating factors for juvenile Class IA offenders, and the heinous, planned nature of the crime.
- The court resentenced Jones to 80 years to life with credit for time served and parole eligibility at age 56; Jones appealed, arguing the sentence was de facto life without parole, due-process deficient, and disproportionate.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Jones) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether 80-to-life with parole eligibility at 56 is a de facto life-without-parole sentence in violation of the Eighth Amendment | The long term makes parole illusory (life-expectancy concerns); the parole age yields only "geriatric parole," not a meaningful opportunity for release | Parole eligibility, hope of release, and court consideration of youth factors satisfy Miller; life-expectancy is relevant but not dispositive | Court held sentence is not unconstitutional; parole at 56 provides a meaningful opportunity for release |
| Whether the sentencing court violated due process by failing to make specific findings about age-related characteristics (e.g., "irreparable corruption") | Court should have made explicit findings showing it weighed youth-related factors and whether offender is irreparably corrupt versus transiently immature | Miller does not require formalized findings when sentence leaves parole possible; sentencing statement and record show consideration of statutory factors | Court held no requirement for specific "irreparable corruption" finding where sentence permits parole; due process satisfied by the record |
| Whether the sentence is unconstitutionally disproportionate under the Eighth Amendment | Jones relied on diminished culpability and capacity for change due to youth; argued sentence is excessive compared to other juveniles resentenced under Miller | The crime was planned, malicious, violent, and involved concealment; severity is warranted given offense and offender | Court held the sentence is not grossly disproportionate; Eighth Amendment proportionality standard not violated |
| Whether statutory sentencing requirements for juvenile offenders were applied correctly | Jones argued insufficient individualized consideration under § 28-105.02 factors | State asserted the court expressly considered § 28-105.02 factors, expert testimony, and customary sentencing factors | Court found the sentencing court considered the required factors and complied with Miller and § 28-105.02 |
Key Cases Cited
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (mandatory life without parole for juveniles convicted of homicide violates the Eighth Amendment; individualized youth consideration required)
- Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016) (Miller applies retroactively and requires meaningful opportunity for release)
- State v. Mantich, 287 Neb. 320 (2014) (Nebraska applied Miller retroactively and discussed juvenile resentencing procedures)
- State v. Smith, 295 Neb. 957 (2017) (life-expectancy is relevant but not dispositive to whether parole eligibility offers a meaningful opportunity for release)
- State v. Garza, 295 Neb. 434 (2016) (no requirement for explicit "irreparable corruption" finding when sentence allows parole)
- State v. Nollen, 296 Neb. 94 (2017) (Eighth Amendment sentence review is a question of law)