State v. Jones, 297 Neb. 557

In 1999 Daniel Lee Jones (born Nov. 7, 1981) pled no contest to first-degree murder for a premeditated stabbing that occurred Sept. 29, 1998, when he was 16; he was originally sentenced to life imprisonment.
After Miller v. Alabama and this court’s decision applying Miller retroactively, Jones’s life sentence was vacated in 2015 and he was granted resentencing under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-105.02.
At the 2016 mitigation hearing, Jones presented expert testimony on adolescent brain development, a mental-health evaluation concluding low risk for future violence, family testimony about childhood instability, and prison records showing good conduct.
The district court considered statutory mitigating factors, case law (including Miller), Jones’s conduct in planning and executing a brutal murder, and the goal of leaving some hope for release.
The court resentenced Jones to 80 years to life with parole eligibility at age 56; Jones appealed claiming Eighth Amendment and due process violations and disproportionality.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Jones)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Whether 80-to-life with parole at 56 is a de facto life-without-parole sentence violating the Eighth Amendment	The term until parole at advanced age plus life-expectancy makes release illusory — effectively LWOP	Parole eligibility, sentencing considerations, and intent to leave hope for release satisfy Miller’s requirement	Court held sentence constitutional; parole at 56 provides a meaningful opportunity for release and is not equivalent to LWOP
Whether due process required explicit factual findings about juvenile characteristics (e.g., irreparable corruption)	Court failed to make specific findings showing individualized consideration of age-related traits	Miller and Nebraska precedent do not require formalized fact-findings where parole remains possible; court announced consideration of statutory factors	Court held no requirement for discrete written findings; announcing consideration of § 28-105.02 factors and mitigation evidence was sufficient
Whether the sentence is unconstitutionally disproportionate	Jones argued his youth, maturation, and rehabilitation make the sentence excessive compared with other resentenced juveniles	State emphasized planning, execution, concealment, and brutal nature of the crime warrant severe sentence	Court held sentence not grossly disproportionate given offense gravity and Jones’s role; Eighth Amendment claim rejected

Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (mandatory LWOP for juveniles violates Eighth Amendment)
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (Miller requirements apply retroactively and require meaningful opportunity for release)
State v. Mantich, 287 Neb. 320 (Nebraska application of Miller and retroactivity)
State v. Smith, 295 Neb. 957 (life-expectancy is relevant but not dispositive; meaningful opportunity focuses on realistic chance for release)
State v. Garza, 295 Neb. 434 (no requirement of specific factual finding of irretrievable depravity where sentence allows parole)