State v. Jones, 900 N.W.2d 757

Background

In 1999, Daniel Lee Jones (born Nov. 7, 1981) pled no contest to first-degree murder for a premeditated stabbing that occurred Sept. 1998 when he was 16; he was originally sentenced to life imprisonment.
Jones’s direct appeal was resolved earlier; following Miller v. Alabama, he filed a postconviction Miller claim and, after remand, his life sentence was vacated in 2015 and the matter set for resentencing.
At an August 2016 mitigation hearing, Jones presented expert testimony on adolescent brain development, a clinical evaluation finding low risk for future violence, family testimony about a troubled upbringing, and prison records showing good behavior.
The district court considered Jones’s age at offense, mental and social background, the violent and premeditated nature of the crime, statutory mitigating factors under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-105.02(2), and DOC records.
On resentencing (Oct. 3, 2016) the court imposed 80 years to life with credit for time served and parole eligibility at age 56. Jones appealed, arguing the sentence is effectively life without parole, the court failed to make specific age-related findings, and the sentence is disproportional.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Jones)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Whether 80-to-life with parole eligibility at 56 is a de facto life-without-parole (Eighth Amendment)	The term length and life-expectancy evidence make parole eligibility at 56 effectively meaningless; it denies a meaningful opportunity for release	Parole eligibility satisfies Miller/Montgomery; life-expectancy is relevant but not dispositive and the court expressly intended to retain hope of release	Court: Not a de facto life-without-parole; parole eligibility at 56 is constitutional given consideration of factors and intent to allow possible release
Whether due process required explicit, specific findings about age-related characteristics or "irreparable corruption"	The sentencing court failed to make required specific findings showing it adequately considered juvenile characteristics and whether Jones is irreparably corrupt	Miller does not impose a formal fact‑finding requirement where sentence allows parole; the court announced consideration of statutory factors and evidence	Court: No error; specific ‘‘irreparable corruption’’ finding not required because sentence is not life without parole and statutory factors were considered
Whether the sentence is unconstitutionally disproportionate	Jones: his youth, demonstrated maturation, and comparative sentences of resentenced juveniles show the sentence is excessive	State: The crime was planned, brutal, and involved concealment and lethality; severity is justified by offense and offender history	Court: Sentence not grossly disproportionate; Eighth Amendment proportionality challenge fails

Key Cases Cited

Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (holding mandatory life without parole for juveniles violates the Eighth Amendment and requires individualized consideration)
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016) (Miller’s rule applies retroactively and requires meaningful opportunity for release)
State v. Mantich, 287 Neb. 320 (2014) (Nebraska court applying Miller retroactively and discussing juvenile resentencing)
State v. Garza, 295 Neb. 434 (2016) (rejecting requirement of specific ‘‘irreparable corruption’’ findings where parole remains possible)
State v. Smith, 295 Neb. 957 (2017) (life expectancy not dispositive; ‘‘meaningful opportunity’’ to obtain release is required)
State v. Nollen, 296 Neb. 94 (2017) (discussing Eighth Amendment sentencing review standards)