State v. Jones
155 A.3d 492
| Md. | 2017Background
- Tyshon L. Jones was tried for the beating, robbery, and shooting death of Julian Kelly; the jury acquitted Jones of first-degree and second-degree intentional murder, robbery, and armed robbery, but hung on first-degree felony murder and a firearm-use count, leading to a mistrial on those counts.
- After acquittals and the mistrial, the State sought to retry Jones on second-degree felony murder predicated on first-degree assault (either assault with intent to cause serious physical injury or assault with a firearm).
- Jones moved to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds; the circuit court denied the motion and he took an interlocutory appeal under the collateral-order doctrine.
- The Court of Special Appeals held that retrial on second-degree felony murder based on first-degree assault would violate double jeopardy because that offense was the same as the acquitted second-degree specific-intent murder.
- The Maryland Court of Appeals (majority) granted certiorari, concluded it had jurisdiction to reconsider Roary v. State, overruled Roary, and adopted the merger doctrine: first-degree assault that is the same act causing the death merges into the homicide and cannot serve as the predicate felony for felony murder.
- The Court vacated the Court of Special Appeals opinion, affirmed its judgment as to outcome (Jones cannot be retried on felony murder predicated on first-degree assault), but on the new ground that such assaults merge with the homicide; remanded for retrial only on the firearm-use count.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jurisdiction to reconsider Roary sua sponte in an interlocutory collateral-order appeal | State: Court may revisit prior precedent because the Roary issue is inextricably intertwined with the double jeopardy question and courts have inherent authority to overrule prior decisions | Jones: Collateral-order jurisdiction is narrow; overturning Roary here exceeds interlocutory review because the Roary question is not collateral to the merits | Court: Has inherent authority to reconsider prior decisions when issue is inextricably intertwined with the collateral-order appeal; exercised that power here |
| Whether first-degree assault may be a predicate felony for second-degree felony murder (merger doctrine) | State: Roary allows first-degree assault (when inherently dangerous or so committed) as predicate for felony murder; maintaining Roary deters dangerous conduct | Jones: Allowing assault as predicate collapses homicide gradations and creates unfair consequences; alternatively, double jeopardy bars retrial | Court: Overrules Roary; adopts merger doctrine — when the assault is the same act that causes death, it merges into the homicide and cannot serve as the predicate felony |
| Double jeopardy bar to retrial on second-degree felony murder after acquittal on second-degree specific-intent murder | Jones/Court of Special Appeals: Retrial on felony-murder (predicated on assault) would be barred because the offenses are the same for double jeopardy purposes | State: Acquittal on specific-intent murder does not preclude prosecution for felony murder based on a distinct predicate felony (assault) | Court: Did not decide double jeopardy question on the merits because it resolved the case by overruling Roary and holding assault cannot serve as predicate when it is the homicidal act; outcome (no retrial on that felony-murder count) stands on merger ground |
| Remedy and scope (prospective effect) | State: urged preservation of Roary or at least limited change | Jones: sought dismissal and protection from reprosecution | Court: Judgment of Court of Special Appeals affirmed (vacating its opinion), Roary overruled prospectively, retrial allowed only on firearm-use count; merger rule prospective-only with respect to prior final direct-appeal cases |
Key Cases Cited
- Roary v. State, 385 Md. 217 (Md. 2005) (previously held first-degree assault may be predicate for second-degree felony murder; now overruled)
- Fisher v. State, 367 Md. 218 (Md. 2001) (explains that non-enumerated felonies may serve as predicate for second-degree felony murder if inherently dangerous or committed in a manner dangerous to life)
- Thornton v. State, 397 Md. 704 (Md. 2007) (distinguishes mens rea between second-degree specific-intent murder and first-degree assault; guides lesser-included analysis)
- Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (U.S. 1932) (required-elements test for determining whether two offenses are the same for double jeopardy)
- People v. Moran, 246 N.Y. 100 (N.Y. 1927) (Cardozo opinion adopting the merger principle: underlying felony must be independent of the homicide)
- People v. Ireland, 70 Cal.2d 522 (Cal. 1969) (en banc) (California endorsement of merger doctrine; felony-murder may not be based on an integral assault that culminates in homicide)