State v. Jones, 1 CA-CR 15-0372

Background

Appellant Craig Murray Jones was charged with 26 counts for sexual offenses, child abuse, and aggravated assault against three minors (two daughters and a niece); jury convicted on most counts and trial court sentenced to an aggregate 114 years.
Jones initially was granted self-representation with advisory counsel but the trial court later revoked his pro se status and appointed counsel after months of dilatory conduct and failures to prepare/disclose witnesses while in custody.
During HJ’s testimony, cross-examination suggested possible recent fabrication or improper influence; the court admitted prior consistent statements (HJ’s earlier disclosure to another witness) under Ariz. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B).
The court imposed consecutive sentences on certain dangerous-crimes-against-children convictions pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-705(M).
After the State rested, the court amended Count 3 (originally charged as molestation based on alleged digital-vaginal contact) to sexual abuse (based on testimony of breast/chest contact) over Jones’s objection; the Court of Appeals vacated the conviction on the amended Count 3 for violating Rule 13.5(b).

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Jones)	Held
Whether the trial court erred in revoking Jones’s waiver of counsel	Court properly revoked because Jones’s self-representation was undermining orderly, efficient proceedings	Revocation improper; custody limitations and difficulty communicating shouldn’t justify taking away right to self-represent	Affirmed: no abuse of discretion; Jones’s dilatory, contradictory conduct and failure to prepare justified revocation (Gomez standard)
Whether admission of HJ’s prior consistent statements was hearsay error	Statements admissible under Ariz. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B) to rebut implied charge of recent fabrication/improper influence and to rehabilitate credibility	Admission was hearsay and prejudicial; cross-examination did not imply fabrication	Affirmed: trial court did not abuse discretion; prior statements admissible to rebut/impeachment context
Whether consecutive sentences (counts 8→1 and 7→4) were improper when based on same act	Consecutive sentences required by more specific statute for dangerous crimes against children, §13-705(M)	Consecutive sentences violate §13-116 when punishable under different statutes for same act	Affirmed: §13-705(M) controls and mandates consecutive sentences for dangerous crimes against children, even for same-act convictions
Whether amending Count 3 from molestation to sexual abuse violated Rule 13.5(b)	Amendment proper as conforming indictment to evidence; error, if any, harmless	Amendment changed nature of offense without notice and prejudiced defense	Reversed (vacated conviction/sentence on amended Count 3): amendment changed the charged offense and was not a mere technical correction; prejudice not shown harmless

Key Cases Cited

State v. Moody, 192 Ariz. 505 (1998) (defendant has constitutional right to self-representation but it is not absolute)
State v. Gomez, 231 Ariz. 219 (2012) (standard for revoking waiver: self-representation that undermines court’s ability to conduct orderly proceedings)
State v. Freeney, 223 Ariz. 110 (2009) (limits on Rule 13.5(b): indictment may not be amended to change nature/essential elements of charge)
State v. Jones, 235 Ariz. 501 (2014) (specific sentencing provision §13-705(M) governs over general §13-116 for dangerous crimes against children)
State v. Siddle, 202 Ariz. 512 (App. 2002) (de novo review of whether consecutive sentences are permissible under §13-116)