State v. Jones, 74 So. 3d 197

Jones, a police official, was charged with forcible rape and indecent behavior with a juvenile; jury found not guilty on rape counts and guilty of attempted indecent behavior with a juvenile; the Third Circuit reversed, prompting review of whether his verbal request constituted an overt act toward indecent behavior with a juvenile.
The indecent behavior statute prohibits lewd acts toward juveniles or electronic transmissions depicting lewd conduct to a juvenile (under 17, age diff >2).
The State argued the defendant possessed specific intent to commit a lewd act and committed an act tending directly toward its accomplishment; the environment included a known transvestite present and other lewd remarks.
Jones testified the statement was joking with no intent to arouse the victim; the defense highlighted his lack of overt physical action.
The Court held that in this context a verbal request could constitute an attempt under La. R.S. 14:27 and reinstated the jury verdict of attempted indecent behavior with a juvenile.
The majority emphasized protecting children and aligning the interpretation of 14:81 with the statute’s protectionist goals, including that an overt act may be satisfied by the act’s purpose and surrounding circumstances.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a verbal request constitutes an overt act for attempt	State argues the context and intent show an overt act toward the crime	Jones argues no overt act; mere words cannot satisfy 14:27	Yes; rational jury could find an overt act intended to accomplish the crime
Whether specific intent is proven beyond reasonable doubt	State relies on surrounding evidence to show purpose to arouse	Jones contends lack of intent; testimony and context negate specific intent	Yes; jury could infer specific intent from totality of circumstances
Whether the overt act continuum allows verbal acts to substitute for physical acts in 14:81 context	Statute aims to protect juveniles; electronic or verbal acts can complete the crime	Overt act requirement normally demands physical action; Baxley limits mere solicitation	Yes; in this context, a verbal act can be an overt act toward completion of the offense
Whether Baxter/Baxley distinction applies to 14:81, and if so how	Baxley distinguishes solicitation from attempt; here, context matters	Baxley bars mere solicitation as attempt across statutes	Distinguishable; the majority reads 14:81 broadly to protect children

State v. Baxley, 633 So.2d 142 (La. 1994) (mere discussion or solicitation cannot constitute an attempt; requires overt act)
State v. Smith, 661 So.2d 442 (La. 1995) (overt acts beyond mere solicitation when coercive or familial context exists)
State v. Ordodi, 946 So.2d 654 (La. 2006) (two elements: specific intent and overt act; continuum assessment)
State v. Fussell, 974 So.2d 1223 (La. 2008) (interpret statutes as a whole with protectionist legislative intent)
State v. Interiano, 868 So.2d 9 (La. 2004) (protective approach to juveniles in sex-crime statutes)