State v. Jones
257 P.3d 268
| Kan. | 2011Background
- Jones, aged 16 in 1998, was charged with first-degree murder and aggravated burglary and certified to stand trial as an adult.
- In 2000, Jones was convicted and sentenced to life with no parole for 25 years; he appealed the conviction and sentence (Jones I).
- Jones later challenged the waiver process via a pro se 60-1507 motion (ineffective assistance) leading to Jones II, where the appellate court affirmed deficiencies but without prejudice to relief.
- Approximately three months after Jones II, Jones filed a K.S.A. 22-3504 motion to correct an illegal sentence alleging notice failures in juvenile proceedings.
- The district court summarily denied the motion, citing 60-1507's prohibition on second or successive relief and Jones's prior petitions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether 60-1507 applies to a 22-3504 motion | Jones argues 60-1507 does not apply to his illegal-sentence challenge | State argues 60-1507 applies due to a preliminary review requirement for such motions | 60-1507 applies for preliminary review of the motion |
| Whether the motion was a successive filing | Jones contends not a successive motion since new grounds were raised | State contends the motion repeats prior, resolved challenges | The court concluded the motion is not a proper successive challenge that warrants relief |
| Whether defects in juvenile waiver render the sentence illegal | Jones asserts due process notice failures invalidate the sentence | State asserts such defects did not deprive jurisdiction or render the sentence illegal | Defects did not deprive jurisdiction; no illegal sentence established |
| Whether Gault or Kent governs the due-process analysis for waiver | Gault governs the required protections | Kent governs due-process in waiver proceedings; Gault does not control here | Kent controls; no due-process violation sufficient to invalidate the sentence |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (due process in juvenile hearings; not controlling for waiver context here)
- Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966) (due process for waiver of juvenile jurisdiction)
- Muhammad, 237 Kan. 850 (1985) (waiver hearing not adjudicatory; distinguished from Gault)
- Jones I, 273 Kan. 756 (2002) (due process protections at counsel and critical stages; rejection of initial claims)
- State v. Duke, 263 Kan. 193 (1997) (preliminary screening under 60-1507 for motions after sentencing)
- State v. Nunn, 247 Kan. 576 (1990) (appointment of counsel; procedural thresholds under 60-1507)