State v. Jonathan Earl Folk
162 Idaho 620
| Idaho | 2017Background
- On Dec. 25, 2007, Mother discovered defendant Jonathan Folk kneeling at a 5‑year‑old child’s bed with the child’s legs around him; both were clothed; Child later told Mother Folk had placed his mouth on Child’s penis. Folk was initially tried and convicted for lewd conduct; the Idaho Supreme Court vacated that conviction in State v. Folk (Folk I). After subsequent proceedings and a second reversal by the Court of Appeals (Folk II), the State refiled, charging sexual abuse of a child under sixteen based on alleged tickling/touching of the child’s stomach/feet/hips.
- The district court allowed limited testimony from Blaine Blair—that Folk had said he desired to sexually abuse children—via narrowly framed leading questions and admitted testimony about the alleged oral‑genital contact as 404(b) evidence of intent.
- Folk repeatedly sought to introduce the child’s prior trial testimony (to refresh memory and for impeachment); the court largely excluded that prior testimony under the rules governing refreshing memory and impeachment (I.R.E. 612 and 613), and limited extrinsic impeachment.
- Detective Galbreaith testified about statements the child made in an unsworn interview; the court admitted that testimony for impeachment/credibility purposes only and gave a limiting instruction.
- The jury convicted Folk of sexual abuse (I.C. § 18‑1506(1)(b)); the persistent violator enhancement was dismissed and Folk received a fixed 25‑year sentence. On appeal Folk raised numerous evidentiary objections, challenged the denial of his Rule 29 motion for acquittal, and alleged prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Folk) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of Blair’s testimony (other‑acts/statements of intent) | Blair’s testimony is relevant to motive/intent and not unfairly prejudicial when narrowly limited | Testimony irrelevant to tickling/hip touching and unduly prejudicial; Blair’s memory unreliable | Court upheld admission: relevant to intent and probative value outweighed danger of unfair prejudice when limited to statements of future intent (I.R.E. 404(b), 403) |
| Admission of testimony about alleged oral‑genital contact (prior alleged act) | Admissible as circumstantial evidence of intent to gratify sexual desire (404(b)) and not unfairly prejudicial | Irrelevant under Kralovec, confusing, and unfairly prejudicial; amounted to res gestae revival | Court upheld admission: probative of intent, permissible under 404(b)/403, jury limited by instructions to charged acts (tickling/hips) |
| Exclusion of Child’s prior sworn testimony (refresh/impeach) | N/A | Prior testimony admissible non‑hearsay (I.R.E. 801(d)(1)(A)) and as extrinsic impeachment when child says he doesn’t remember (I.R.E. 613) | Most arguments not preserved; court properly exercised discretion under Rule 613 and 612—no abuse of discretion shown |
| Admission of Detective Galbreaith’s testimony about child’s unsworn interview | Testimony admitted only for credibility/impeachment; State says Folk opened the door | Galbreaith’s testimony was hearsay and not opened by defendant | Court held Folk opened the door during cross and testimony admissible for credibility only; limiting instruction given and upheld |
| Sufficiency of evidence; denial of Rule 29 motion | Evidence (circumstantial, Blair, child testimony, surrounding facts) supports intent element | Insufficient proof of intent to gratify sexual desire—no direct evidence of intent for the charged touching | Court found that, viewing evidence in light most favorable to prosecution, a rational juror could infer intent; denial of acquittal affirmed |
| Prosecutorial misconduct in closing (false inferences, comments on silence, emotional appeals) | Prosecutor’s inferences were grounded in evidence; remarks responded to defendant’s argument; any error remedied by limiting instruction | Prosecutor vouched for Blair, misstated known impeachment, improperly commented on refusal to testify, appealed to passions—amounting to fundamental error | No fundamental error: prosecutor acted within allowable advocacy bounds or responded to Folk’s argument; any questionable remarks were cured by court instruction |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Folk, 151 Idaho 327 (Idaho 2011) (vacating prior conviction on confrontation and other grounds)
- State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49 (Idaho 2009) (two‑tier test for admissibility of other‑acts evidence under I.R.E. 404(b) and 403 balancing)
- State v. Kralovec, 161 Idaho 569 (Idaho 2017) (rejecting res gestae as a free‑standing doctrine; evidence must meet Idaho Rules of Evidence)
- State v. Oldham, 92 Idaho 124 (Idaho 1968) (specific intent may be proved by circumstantial evidence and conduct)
- State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694 (Idaho 2009) (standard for prosecutorial misconduct review and fundamental error analysis)
- United States v. Blueford, 312 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 2002) (prosecutor may not argue inferences known to be false; distinction between good‑faith inference and knowing falsehood)