State v. Jonathan C. Richards, 256 A.3d 94

Richards and complainant briefly reconciled in March 2018; an April 27 altercation ensued at complainant’s apartment during which Richards refused to relinquish their baby until police arrived.
Richards was charged with aggravated domestic assault, domestic assault, and misdemeanor unlawful trespass under 13 V.S.A. § 3705(a).
At trial Richards was acquitted of the assault charges but convicted of misdemeanor unlawful trespass.
Richards requested a jury instruction that the State must prove he knew he lacked authority/consent to remain in the apartment (a mens rea element). The trial court refused, concluding § 3705(a) contains no knowledge element.
At sentencing the court imposed probation including the condition that Richards not “engage in criminal behavior,” which Richards challenged as unconstitutionally vague.
Richards appealed, raising (1) the omission of a knowledge instruction for § 3705(a) and (2) the vagueness/abuse of discretion in imposing the probation condition.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether § 3705(a) requires a knowledge (mens rea) element that the actor knew he lacked authority/consent	State: statute’s plain language lacks a knowledge requirement; legislative scheme shows intentional omission	Richards: common-law origins and mens rea principles imply a knowledge requirement; analogies to other statutes (Day) support implying scienter	Court: affirmed no knowledge element; Legislature deliberately omitted it in § 3705(a) (notice element functions as substitute)
Whether probation condition forbidding Richards from "engag[ing] in criminal behavior" is unconstitutionally vague or an abuse of discretion	State: condition reasonably necessary to ensure law‑abiding conduct after trespass conviction	Richards: phrase is vague, could cover lawful conduct and permit revocation on preponderance standard without fair notice	Court: condition is facially valid, means unlawful/criminal conduct, gives adequate notice, and is within sentencing discretion

State v. Fanger, 665 A.2d 36 (Vt. 1995) (interpreting § 3705(d) to require a subjective "knowing" element for felony trespass)
State v. Roy, 557 A.2d 884 (Vt. 1989) (declining to imply mens rea where statute uses substitute objective elements)
State v. Day, 549 A.2d 1061 (Vt. 1988) (recognizing "without consent" can imply a knowledge or should‑have‑known standard in a different statutory context)
State v. Pixley, 200 A.3d 174 (Vt. 2018) (holding signs/placards notice provision creates an objective standard)
State v. Richland, 132 A.3d 702 (Vt. 2015) (statutory interpretation presumption that Legislature knows how to include scienter)
State v. Kreth, 553 A.2d 554 (Vt. 1988) (noting similarity between § 3705(d) and Model Penal Code knowledge language)