State v. Jonas, 904 N.W.2d 566

Background

Defendant Stephen Jonas (gay) was tried for murder after admitting to stabbing the victim but claiming self-defense; trial began July 2015 and jury convicted him of second-degree murder.
Juror questionnaire asked whether the defendant’s homosexuality would affect impartiality; one veniremember answered affirmatively and said he "would have a hard time overlooking it."
During individual voir dire the prospective juror said he would "try" to be fair but repeatedly acknowledged bias would remain "in the back of my mind" and that Jonas "would probably do better without me on the jury."
Defense moved to strike that veniremember for cause; the district court denied the challenge but the defense used a peremptory strike to remove him and later exhausted all peremptory strikes.
On appeal Jonas argued the court abused its discretion by denying a for-cause strike and that being forced to use a peremptory strike required reversal even though the biased veniremember did not sit; the court of appeals and supreme court affirmed the conviction.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to strike a prospective juror for cause after the juror acknowledged bias against gay people	Jonas argued the juror’s questionnaire and voir dire showed actual, unequivocal bias that could not be rehabilitated and thus required dismissal for cause	State argued the juror repeatedly said he would try to follow the law and the court reasonably concluded he could be impartial; peremptory strikes exist to remove borderline jurors	Court held the district court abused its discretion in refusing to strike the juror for cause because the juror repeatedly expressed bias that persisted after colloquy
Whether Jonas was prejudiced such that reversal is required when he used a peremptory strike to remove a juror who should have been struck for cause but that juror did not serve	Jonas argued he was forced to expend a peremptory strike to remove a juror who should have been excused, entitling him to reversal under longstanding Iowa precedent	State argued under Neuendorf and subsequent U.S. Supreme Court precedent a defendant must show actual prejudice when the challenged juror did not sit	Court applied a middle rule: to show prejudice when an erroneously denied for-cause challenge forces use of a peremptory, defendant must (1) exhaust peremptory strikes, (2) identify a particular seated juror he would have removed with an additional strike, and (3) seek an extra strike and have the court refuse it; Jonas did not meet that test, so Neuendorf governs and no reversal was required

Key Cases Cited

Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 (1992) (a veniremember’s statement of actual bias cannot be cured merely by general assurances that the juror will follow instructions)
Neuendorf v. State, 509 N.W.2d 743 (Iowa 1993) (Iowa precedent holding prejudice must be shown when an improperly denied for-cause juror is removed by peremptory strike)
Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81 (1988) (under federal Constitution, no automatic reversal when defendant uses peremptories to cure a denied for-cause challenge; prejudice assessed by impartiality of seated jury)
United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304 (2000) (federal law does not require automatic reversal when a defendant uses a peremptory to remove a juror who should have been stricken for cause)
Rivera v. Illinois, 556 U.S. 148 (2009) (erroneous denial of a state-provided peremptory challenge is not necessarily a federal due-process violation; states may provide greater protection)
State v. Mootz, 808 N.W.2d 207 (Iowa 2011) (Iowa held erroneous denial of a peremptory strike that results in seating an objectionable juror is presumed prejudicial under state law; influenced the court’s discussion of remedies)