889 S.E.2d 573
S.C.2023Background
- Petitioner Jon Smart (age 16 at offense) and co-defendant murdered a citizen volunteer in 1999, then stole the victim's truck and engaged in a violent crime spree; Smart pled guilty and was sentenced to life without parole under then-applicable law.
- Under S.C. Code § 16-3-20(A) as of 1999, Smart was not parole-eligible; he sought resentencing after Miller v. Alabama and this Court's Aiken decision, which required individualized resentencing consideration for juveniles.
- The resentencing court again imposed life without parole; Smart appealed, arguing the court improperly placed a burden on him to show LWOP was inappropriate and that the State should have borne any burden.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed; the South Carolina Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve whether any party bears a burden of proof or persuasion at an Aiken resentencing.
- The Supreme Court clarified Aiken resentencings are de novo, with no presumption for or against any sentence; neither party bears a burden of persuasion—each has a mutual production burden to present evidence on the Aiken factors.
- Applying that standard, the Court held the resentencing court conducted an individualized Aiken hearing, did not impose an improper burden on Smart, and properly exercised its discretion in imposing life.
Issues
| Issue | Smart's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a juvenile seeking Aiken resentencing bears a burden of proof or persuasion (or whether the State must prove LWOP appropriate) | Resentencing court required Smart to show LWOP inappropriate; Miller/Aiken language implies a presumption against LWOP so the State should bear burden | No party should bear a burden of persuasion; sentencing is discretionary and courts should apply Aiken factors without a presumption | No burden of proof or persuasion on either party; no presumption for/against LWOP; mutual burden to produce evidence; court has sentencing discretion |
| Whether Miller/Aiken statements about rarity of juvenile LWOP create a legal presumption or burden-shifting | Miller/Aiken’s references to the rarity of LWOP create a presumption against LWOP and require the State to justify LWOP | Those statements are normative guidance about difficulty of distinguishing cases, not a rule shifting burdens | Court rejects a presumption and burden-shifting; Miller/Aiken guidance does not impose a legal burden on the State |
| Whether the resentencing court improperly gave deference to the prior life sentence or otherwise misapplied Aiken procedure | The court’s oral language suggested it placed an improper burden on Smart or deferred to the prior sentence | The court conducted a de novo resentencing, considered all evidence and Aiken factors | Record shows the court fully considered mitigating youth features, treated the proceeding de novo with no deference to the prior sentence; affirmed LWOP sentence |
Key Cases Cited
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (Eighth Amendment bars mandatory life-without-parole for juveniles)
- Aiken v. Byars, 410 S.C. 534 (S.C. application of Miller requiring individualized resentencing and listing factors to consider)
- Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (recognizing juveniles' diminished culpability in capital context)
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (prohibiting juvenile life without parole for non-homicide offenses and discussing juvenile differences)
- Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307 (no separate factual finding of permanent incorrigibility required before imposing juvenile LWOP)
- State v. Smart (Smart II), 433 S.C. 651 (Ct. App.) (prior appellate discussion of Smart’s resentencing)
- State v. Bolin, 209 S.C. 108 (sentencing length rests in trial court discretion)