State v. Johnson, 246 N.C. App. 139

In Dec. 2014 Defendant pleaded guilty (Alford plea) to discharge of a weapon into occupied property and possession of a firearm by a felon; both sentences suspended and 36 months probation ordered, including 120 days of house arrest with electronic monitoring.
Probation officer Joshua Benfield filed three violation reports: two dated Jan. 16, 2015 (alleging absconding, drug use/possession, failure to report, and unpaid costs; one also alleged leaving residence while on house arrest), and one dated Mar. 16, 2015 (alleging unauthorized trips while on electronic house arrest).
At the revocation hearing the officer testified Defendant told him on Jan. 12 he would not attend a Jan. 13 office visit and then failed to appear; the officer also acknowledged the electronic monitor reported Defendant’s locations continuously.
The trial court found Defendant "willfully and without valid excuse" violated probation (including the absconding provision) and entered Form AOC-CR-607 judgments revoking probation and activating the suspended sentences in both cases; Defendant appealed.
The court of appeals considered whether the proven conduct qualified as "absconding" under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1343(b)(3a) given post-2011 JRA limits on when probation may be revoked and a suspended sentence activated.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Defendant's failure to report to a scheduled office visit and/or unauthorized short trips while on electronic house arrest constitutes "absconding" under § 15A-1343(b)(3a), permitting revocation and activation of suspended sentence	The State argued those acts satisfied the statutory absconding provision and therefore supported revocation and activation	Defendant argued mere failure to report or brief unapproved movements while continuously tracked by an electronic monitor do not make his whereabouts "unknown" and thus are not absconding under the statute	Court vacated revocations: telling officer you will not report and failing to appear, and unapproved but monitored trips, do not constitute "absconding" under § 15A-1343(b)(3a); revocation not authorized absent new crime or statutory procedures in § 15A-1344(d2)

State v. Young, 190 N.C. App. 458, 660 S.E.2d 574 (discusses standard for revocation hearing and appellate review)
Moore v. Proper, 366 N.C. 25, 726 S.E.2d 812 (statutory interpretation reviewed de novo)
State v. Tindall, 227 N.C. App. 183, 742 S.E.2d 272 (explains JRA limits on when courts may revoke probation)
State v. Coffey, 336 N.C. 412, 444 S.E.2d 431 (statutory construction principle that statutes should not render words superfluous)
State v. Tozzi, 84 N.C. App. 517, 353 S.E.2d 250 (pre-JRA rule that any violation could support revocation)