128 So. 3d 325
La. Ct. App.2013Background
- Defendant Joshua Johnson was convicted by a jury of simple burglary of an inhabited dwelling and forgery following an October 2012 trial.
- On October 30–31, 2012, Johnson filed a motion for appeal which the trial court granted before the court later sentenced him on November 8, 2012.
- After sentencing, the State filed a habitual-offender bill; on November 13, 2012 the trial court adjudicated Johnson a second-felony offender, vacated the original burglary sentence and imposed an enhanced 24-year hard labor sentence without benefits.
- Johnson filed a motion for new trial and a motion to reconsider sentence; the record shows the trial court denied the new-trial motion and did not rule on the motion to reconsider sentence while it had been divested of jurisdiction by the previously granted appeal.
- The appellate court found the trial court lacked jurisdiction to rule on the new-trial motion (and to impose enhanced sentence) after granting the appeal, creating a due-process issue because one of the new-trial arguments was also raised on appeal.
- The appellate court vacated all sentences (underlying and habitual-offender) and remanded for the trial court to rule on the new-trial motion and, if denied, to resentence Johnson (preserving appellate rights after resentencing).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether trial court had jurisdiction to sentence or rule on new-trial motion after granting an appeal | State proceeded with habitual-offender adjudication and sentencing after appeal granted | Johnson argued the trial court was divested of jurisdiction once appeal was granted and thus any action (sentencing/hardship adjudication/new-trial ruling) was void | Court held the trial court was divested of jurisdiction upon granting appeal and erred in ruling on new-trial motion and imposing enhanced sentence; vacated sentences and remanded |
| Whether error was harmless and appeal should be dismissed or permitted to proceed | State relied on precedents where post-appeal sentencing was treated as harmless to avoid delay | Johnson argued the error impaired due process because trial court ruled on an issue (new trial) he raised on appeal | Court distinguished prior cases and held due-process concerns required remand rather than treating error as harmless; appellate review of improperly decided issues must be preceded by a trial-court ruling made with proper jurisdiction |
| Whether premature appeal can be "cured" by later grant of appeal where initial filing/scheduling error was defendant-attributable | State cited cases where a defendant’s premature filing was cured when the trial court later granted the appeal after sentencing | Johnson emphasized that the trial court here granted the appeal before sentencing, so the court’s grant (not just defendant’s filing) divested jurisdiction | Court noted distinction: where the court prematurely grants appeal it cannot later "cure" jurisdiction; cure applies only where defect is solely defendant’s error and court grants appeal after sentencing |
| Remedy: vacatur and remand vs. dismissal or harmless-error approach | State argued equitable judicial-economy considerations may counsel against remand | Johnson argued his due-process rights require a properly constituted trial-court ruling on new-trial grounds before appellate merits review | Court vacated all sentences and remanded for the trial court to rule on the new-trial motion and, if denied, to resentence, prioritizing due process over marginal judicial-economy savings |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Lampkin, 119 So.3d 158 (La. App. 5 Cir.) (court allowed appeal to proceed despite post-appeal sentencing to avoid delay of appellate review)
- State v. Brown, 451 So.2d 1074 (La. 1984) (trial court lacks jurisdiction to entertain motion for new trial once appeal is granted)
- State v. Robinson, 743 So.2d 814 (La. App. 4 Cir.) (post-appeal denial of new-trial motion found harmless where defendant did not raise it on appeal)
- State v. Enclard, 850 So.2d 845 (La. App. 5 Cir.) (prematurely filed appeal by defendant may be cured if court later grants appeal after sentencing when defect is defendant-attributable)
- State v. Hayes, 806 So.2d 816 (La. App. 5 Cir.) (same principle regarding cure of defendant-attributable premature appeals)
- State v. Conrad, 620 So.2d 366 (La. App. 5 Cir.) (discussing appellate disposition when trial court acts after being divested of jurisdiction)