2021 Ohio 1869
Ohio Ct. App.2021Background
- On Oct. 10, 2017 James A. Johnson III swerved across the centerline and struck a northbound school bus, injuring the bus driver and an adult passenger; Johnson tested positive for methamphetamine.
- Johnson pled guilty Aug. 3, 2018 to one count of aggravated vehicular assault (second-degree felony).
- At sentencing (Sept. 10–11, 2018) the trial court imposed an eight-year term (to run consecutively with another sentence) but expressly retained jurisdiction to decide restitution later.
- Johnson filed a premature appeal (Sept. 17, 2018); this court dismissed that appeal Apr. 6, 2020 for lack of a final appealable order and remanded for the unresolved restitution issue.
- The Ohio Victims of Crime Compensation Program (OVCCP) had paid the injured passenger $8,876.57 (decision dated Jan. 10, 2019). At a July 28, 2020 restitution hearing the trial court declined to order restitution, reasoning it could not "increase" restitution after the original sentencing.
- The State appealed the refusal to impose restitution; Johnson cross‑appealed arguing an unreasonable delay in sentencing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Johnson) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the court was required to order restitution to the OVCCP under Marsy’s Law | Marsy’s Law gives victims a constitutional right to "full and timely restitution," so the trial court must order restitution to OVCCP for amounts it paid the victim. | OVCCP is not the victim under Marsy’s Law; implicitly, Johnson contested any mandatory effect. | Court: Marsy’s Law does not apply because OVCCP is not a "victim" under the constitutional definition; State’s Marsy argument fails. |
| Whether the trial court could impose restitution to OVCCP at the July 28, 2020 hearing | The court had authority under R.C. 2929.18 and related statutes/case law to order restitution to a reparations fund and could do so at the remand hearing. | Trial court treated the absence of a restitution figure in the Sept. 11, 2018 entry as a zero-amount sentence and argued it could not later "increase" restitution. | Court: Trial court erred to the extent it believed it lacked authority; the Sept. 11, 2018 entry deferred restitution and was not a final order, so the court could have imposed restitution on remand. State’s claim on this point is sustained and the matter is remanded for reconsideration. |
| Whether the delay between the original sentencing entry and the Aug. 3, 2020 entry was an unreasonable sentencing delay requiring reversal | State argued no unreasonable delay; sentencing steps were taken promptly and later delay was due to appellate process and proceedings necessary to resolve restitution. | Johnson argued the ultimate imposition of sentence was unreasonably delayed and thus should be reversed. | Court: No unreasonable delay attributable to the State. The trial court held a sentencing hearing promptly; the later delay resulted largely from Johnson’s premature appeal. Johnson’s cross‑assignment is overruled. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Allen, 159 Ohio St.3d 75, 2019-Ohio-4757, 147 N.E.3d 618 (Ohio 2019) (statutory authority for restitution and financial sanctions under R.C. 2929.18)
- State v. Bartholomew, 119 Ohio St.3d 359, 2008-Ohio-4080, 894 N.E.2d 307 (Ohio 2008) (trial courts may order restitution paid to the Attorney General’s reparations fund)
- State v. Perkins, 190 Ohio App.3d 328, 2010-Ohio-5058, 941 N.E.2d 1227 (Ohio Ct. App.) (OVCCP characterized as a reparations fund eligible to receive restitution)
- City of Centerville v. Knab, 162 Ohio St.3d 163, 2020-Ohio-5219, 166 N.E.3d 1167 (Ohio 2020) (interpretation of "person" and "victim" under Marsy’s Law)
- State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, 59 N.E.3d 1231 (Ohio 2016) (standards applied on appellate review of certain sentencing matters)
- In re Zakov, 107 Ohio App.3d 716, 669 N.E.2d 344 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (failure to include restitution determination renders entry interlocutory)
- In re Holmes, 70 Ohio App.2d 75, 434 N.E.2d 747 (Ohio Ct. App. 1980) (an incomplete sentencing entry is not a final appealable order)
