State v. Johnson
178 Conn. App. 490
| Conn. App. Ct. | 2017Background
- On May 29, 2013, Anthony Johnson and Sedwick Daniels robbed a CVS in Glastonbury; surveillance footage and eyewitness reports led to arrests.
- Daniels pleaded guilty to charges related to the robbery and testified at Johnson’s trial identifying Johnson as the other participant.
- Kirk McDowell (M) gave the police a signed written statement saying he saw Kenneth Millege give the car used in the robbery to Daniels, Johnson, and a third person; at trial M recanted, saying he had not actually seen the transfer.
- The state sought to admit M’s signed police statement as a prior inconsistent statement for substantive use under State v. Whelan; the trial court admitted a redacted version.
- A jury convicted Johnson of second‑degree robbery and conspiracy to commit second‑degree robbery; Johnson appealed, raising (1) insufficiency of evidence based on alleged uncorroborated accomplice testimony, (2) failure to give a cautionary instruction about accomplice testimony, and (3) improper admission of M’s Whelan statement.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Johnson) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency: conviction based on accomplice testimony | Accomplice testimony can be enough; precedent allows conviction on uncorroborated accomplice testimony. | Conviction rests on uncorroborated accomplice testimony and is legally insufficient. | Affirmed — Connecticut precedent does not require corroboration of accomplice testimony. |
| Jury instruction: failure to caution re: uncorroborated accomplice testimony | Given instructions adequately cautioned jurors about accomplice credibility and interest; no rule requires a corroboration instruction. | Trial court failed to give a specific cautionary instruction that uncorroborated accomplice testimony is unsafe. | No plain error — instructions (general credibility + specific accomplice charge) were sufficient; law does not mandate a corroboration charge. |
| Admissibility: Whelan prior inconsistent statement (personal knowledge) | M’s signed written statement itself indicates he had personal knowledge when he made it; admissible for substantive use. | M’s statement lacked indicia of reliability and personal knowledge (and M repudiated it at trial). | No abuse of discretion — the statement on its face showed personal knowledge and was properly admitted (redacted). |
| Plain error review availability | State: Kitchens waiver does not bar plain error review; record adequate to review. | Defendant argued for plain error relief on instruction claim. | Court applied plain error standard and found no patent/obvious error or manifest injustice. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Stebbins, 29 Conn. 463 (Conn. 1861) (accomplice testimony need not be corroborated to sustain a conviction)
- State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743 (Conn. 1986) (allows substantive use of a signed prior inconsistent statement by a witness who testifies at trial if the statement shows the declarant had personal knowledge)
- State v. Carey, 76 Conn. 342 (Conn. 1904) (trial judge’s duty to caution jury depends on witness’s character and interest; no absolute rule requiring warning that accomplice testimony is unsafe)
- State v. Pierre, 277 Conn. 42 (Conn. 2006) (trial court’s admissibility rulings reviewed for abuse of discretion; Whelan requirements assessed by looking to the prior statement itself)