State v. JohnsonÂ, 254 N.C. App. 535

Background

Christopher M. Johnson pled Alford to two counts of taking indecent liberties with a child for conduct on October 4, 2011; one sentence was suspended and he was placed on 36 months supervised probation (file 12 CRS 646).
In February 2016 Johnson’s probation officer filed violation reports alleging failures to report, unpaid court/supervision fees, leaving North Carolina without permission (arrests in Virginia for trespassing and staying in Virginia), missing sex-offender treatment, and later classified him as an absconder.
At the March 14, 2016 probation hearing Johnson admitted the violations but disputed willfulness; the officer testified Johnson was an absconder after 30 days without contact following the Virginia arrest.
The trial court found willful violations, revoked probation, and activated the suspended sentence, incorporating the violation reports into its written judgment.
On appeal by certiorari the Court of Appeals concluded the trial court lacked jurisdiction to revoke probation because the State did not plead a JRA revocation-eligible violation and Johnson did not waive notice. The judgment was vacated and the case remanded.

Issues

Issue	State's Argument	Johnson's Argument	Held
Whether the trial court had jurisdiction to revoke probation under the Justice Reinvestment Act (JRA)	The violations (absconding, failure to report, and the Virginia trespass arrest) supported revocation.	Trial court lacked jurisdiction because the State did not allege a JRA revocation-eligible violation and Johnson did not waive notice.	Vacated — court lacked jurisdiction because State failed to allege a revocation-eligible violation and Johnson did not waive notice.
Whether "absconding" (G.S. § 15A-1343(b)(3a)) applied to offenses committed before Dec. 1, 2011	Absconding characterization justified revocation.	Absconding provision does not apply to underlying offenses committed before Dec. 1, 2011 (the "donut hole").	Held — absconding under § 15A-1343(b)(3a) did not apply because the underlying offense occurred Oct. 4, 2011.
Whether the trespass arrest in Virginia constituted a new criminal offense sufficient for revocation (G.S. § 15A-1343(b)(1))	The Virginia trespass arrest could be treated as a new criminal offense supporting revocation.	The violation reports did not specifically allege that the trespass arrest was a revocation-eligible new criminal offense; lack of notice deprives jurisdiction.	Held — State failed to give adequate notice that revocation would be sought on the basis of a new criminal offense, so court lacked jurisdiction on that theory.
Whether waiver of notice was established	Implicit waiver from admission of violations at hearing.	Johnson did not waive his statutory right to notice; he admitted violations but not willfulness.	Held — no waiver; because no adequate notice of a revocation-eligible violation, revocation was improper.

Key Cases Cited

State v. Kornegay, 228 N.C. App. 320, 745 S.E.2d 880 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013) (subject-matter jurisdiction in probation revocation is statutory; lack of notice defeats revocation).
State v. Nolen, 228 N.C. App. 203, 743 S.E.2d 729 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013) (explains JRA limits on revocation and the effective-date irregularity creating the "donut hole").
State v. Hancock, 789 S.E.2d 522 (N.C. Ct. App. 2016) (defendant with pre‑Dec. 1, 2011 underlying offense cannot be revoked for JRA absconding; revocation may stand if an adequately pled new criminal offense exists).
State v. Murchison, 367 N.C. 461, 758 S.E.2d 356 (N.C. 2014) (probation proceedings are summary but still subject to statutory requirements).
State v. Tindall, 227 N.C. App. 183, 742 S.E.2d 272 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013) (trial court lacks jurisdiction when violation report does not allege commission of a new criminal offense).