State v. Johnson, 860 N.W.2d 222

Scott A. Johnson was charged by information with possession of a controlled substance on June 7, 2012. He filed pretrial discovery motions and later a motion to suppress on January 17, 2013.
The motion to suppress was heard March 20, 2013; the court took it under advisement and did not rule until December 2, 2013 (over 8 months later).
Johnson moved for absolute discharge on speedy-trial grounds (statutory and constitutional) on December 20, 2013; the district court denied the motion on January 15, 2014, treating the suppression-delay as excludable time under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4)(a).
The district court did not make any findings addressing Johnson’s constitutional Barker factors (length, reason, assertion, prejudice).
On appeal, the Nebraska Court of Appeals affirmed the statutory-speedy-trial ruling (time excluded under § 29-1207(4)(a)) but remanded for the district court to make factual findings and consider Johnson’s constitutional speedy-trial claim.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the period the motion to suppress was under advisement was excludable under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4)(a) (statutory speedy-trial)	Johnson: the long delay (over 8 months) was inordinate/unreasonable judicial delay and should not be fully excluded; statutory right violated	State: time between filing and final disposition of defendant’s pretrial motions is excluded by § 29-1207(4)(a) regardless of promptness	Court: Affirmed — entire period was excludable under § 29-1207(4)(a); no good-cause/reasonableness requirement applies when (4)(a) governs
Whether denial of discharge violated the Sixth Amendment (constitutional speedy-trial)	Johnson: the lengthy delay violated his constitutional right; district court failed to analyze Barker factors	State: argues interlocutory appeal on constitutional-only grounds is not permitted, but this appeal follows a final order denying a nonfrivolous statutory claim so constitutional issue is reviewable	Court: Remanded — district court made no Barker-factor findings; remand for factual findings and balancing
Whether Johnson stated a viable Fifth Amendment due-process claim based on delay	Johnson: argued due process violation (no specific separate theory developed on record)	State: Fifth Amendment generally applies to preindictment delay; heavy burden for due-process delay claims post-arrest	Court: Rejected — Johnson did not meet heavy burden or articulate a distinct due-process claim

State v. Wilcox, 224 Neb. 138, 395 N.W.2d 772 (Neb. 1986) (held lengthy judicial neglect could fall under catchall delay provision and warrant discharge)
State v. Lafler, 225 Neb. 362, 405 N.W.2d 576 (Neb. 1987) (clarified that delays properly excluded under § 29-1207(4)(a) do not require a showing of reasonableness)
State v. Turner, 252 Neb. 620, 564 N.W.2d 231 (Neb. 1997) (construed § 29-1207(4)(a) to exclude all time from filing to disposition of defendant’s pretrial motions)
State v. Hettle, 288 Neb. 288, 848 N.W.2d 582 (Neb. 2014) (statutory and constitutional speedy-trial rights are distinct; § 29-1207 is a useful benchmark for constitutional analysis)
Henderson v. United States, 476 U.S. 321 (U.S. 1986) (federal Speedy Trial Act excludes time between filing and hearing on pretrial motions irrespective of promptness)
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (U.S. 1972) (established four-factor balancing test for Sixth Amendment speedy-trial claims)
United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850 (U.S. 1978) (no interlocutory appeal from denial of relief based solely on constitutional speedy-trial claim)
State v. Wilson, 15 Neb. App. 212, 724 N.W.2d 99 (Neb. Ct. App. 2006) (final order denying a nonfrivolous statutory speedy-trial claim permits review of pendent constitutional speedy-trial claim)