State v. Johnson, 2013 Ohio 4077

Brian E. Johnson was indicted on five counts of felony non-support on December 22, 2010; he was served with the indictment about 14 months later on February 10, 2012.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Johnson pled guilty to four of the five counts and received an aggregate three-year prison sentence.
On appeal Johnson argued (1) the 14-month delay between indictment and service violated his Sixth Amendment speedy-trial rights and (2) defense counsel was ineffective for failing to advise or raise that constitutional speedy-trial claim before Johnson entered his guilty plea, rendering the plea unknowing and involuntary.
The court noted that a guilty plea generally waives speedy-trial claims, but acknowledged an exception where ineffective assistance causes an involuntary plea; it therefore evaluated Johnson’s ineffective-assistance claim under Strickland.
The record was sparse: the reason for the delay was unclear, Johnson admitted he was unaware of the charges during the delay, he was not incarcerated on the charges during the delay, he never asserted a speedy-trial right pre-service, and the record showed no actual prejudice to his defense.
Applying Barker factors and comparing to similar precedent, the court found no reasonable probability that a motion to dismiss on constitutional speedy-trial grounds would have succeeded, so Johnson could not show prejudice from counsel’s allegedly deficient performance.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the 14‑month delay between indictment and service violated the Sixth Amendment speedy‑trial right	State: No violation given lack of prejudice and unclear cause of delay	Johnson: Delay was presumptively prejudicial and violated his constitutional right	Court: No violation—delay triggered Barker analysis but record shows negligible weight, no asserted right, no prejudice
Whether guilty plea waived constitutional speedy‑trial claim	State: Guilty plea waives speedy‑trial claims	Johnson: A constitutional speedy‑trial claim survives a guilty plea, or alternatively counsel’s failure made plea involuntary	Court: Generally plea waives claim, but evaluated ineffective assistance exception and found no prejudice under Strickland
Whether counsel was ineffective for not advising/raising the speedy‑trial issue before plea	State: Counsel’s omission was not prejudicial because claim would likely fail	Johnson: Counsel’s failure made plea unknowing and involuntary	Court: Strickland not satisfied—no reasonable probability that dismissal would have been granted, so no prejudice
Whether the plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary given alleged ineffective assistance	State: Plea was voluntary; no showing counsel’s conduct affected voluntariness	Johnson: Failure to preserve speedy‑trial claim rendered plea unknowing	Court: Plea upheld—insufficient record and no prejudice to show plea was involuntary

Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (Barker four‑factor balancing test for constitutional speedy‑trial claims)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two‑part ineffective assistance standard: deficient performance and prejudice)
State v. Greeno, 25 Ohio St.3d 170 (1986) (guilty plea generally waives statutory speedy‑trial claims; noted exception for ineffective‑assistance/involuntary plea situations)
State v. Triplett, 78 Ohio St.3d 566 (1997) (discusses weight of delay when Sixth Amendment interests like pretrial incarceration are not implicated)
Clark v. Maxwell, 177 Ohio St. 49 (1964) (older Ohio authority treating guilty plea as waiving speedy‑trial claim)
State v. Kelley, 57 Ohio St.3d 127 (1991) (guilty plea waives statutory speedy‑trial rights)
United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850 (1978) (importance of careful, fact‑specific Barker analysis)