State v. Jill Marie Lotter, 313 P.3d 148

Jill Lotter was convicted by a jury of attempted deliberate homicide for striking her husband Mike repeatedly with a hammer on November 9, 2010; she was sentenced to 40 years.
Lotter asserted self-defense / justifiable use of force and sought to present expert testimony on battered woman syndrome and a PTSD diagnosis.
The District Court excluded expert testimony diagnosing Lotter with PTSD or opining on her capacity to form purpose/knowledge because Lotter had not pleaded a mental-disease-or-defect defense and the court found insufficient foundational evidence of prolonged/domestic battering.
A volunteer firefighter testified that, at the November 9 emergency response, Mike muttered, “This is the third time she has tried to kill me.” The court admitted that statement as a prior inconsistent statement and as an excited utterance; Mike later testified at trial but said he could not remember making the remark.
Lotter challenged both evidentiary rulings on appeal: exclusion of expert testimony about battered-woman behaviors/PTSD, and admission of Mike’s prior inconsistent statement.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Admissibility of expert testimony on battered-woman syndrome / PTSD	State: trial court correctly limited expert testimony where foundational evidence of prolonged battering and PTSD was lacking	Lotter: testimony about demeaning conduct, intermittent “rages,” and alleged stalking were sufficient to found expert opinion; PTSD diagnosis admissible under §46-14-213, MCA	Affirmed: court did not abuse discretion; foundation for battered-woman expert testimony was inadequate, so PTSD diagnosis testimony also excluded; testimony on capacity improperly excluded absent mental-disease defense
Admission of Mike’s out-of-court statement to firefighter	State: statement admissible as prior inconsistent statement (M. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(A)) and as excited utterance; Crawford confrontation concerns not implicated because declarant testified	Lotter: statement was hearsay and inherently unreliable; admission violated confrontation/due process (argued also on grounds of inability to cross-examine about making the remark)	Affirmed: admissible under prior inconsistent-statement rule; Crawford inapplicable because declarant testified; due-process theory not preserved for appeal; no abuse of discretion

State v. Stringer, 271 Mont. 367, 897 P.2d 1063 (Mont. 1995) (foundation required before admitting battered-woman-syndrome expert testimony)
State v. Lawrence, 285 Mont. 140, 948 P.2d 186 (Mont. 1997) (declarant’s lapse of memory can be inconsistent testimony for impeachment/rehabilitation)
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (Confrontation Clause bars admission of testimonial hearsay when declarant does not testify)
State v. Mizenko, 330 Mont. 299, 127 P.3d 458 (Mont. 2006) (application of Crawford in Montana criminal cases)
State v. White Water, 194 Mont. 85, 634 P.2d 636 (Mont. 1981) (consideration of circumstances bearing on reliability of out-of-court statements)
State v. Hanks, 817 N.W.2d 663 (Minn. 2012) (similar holding that evidence of a troubled relationship was insufficient to found battered-woman-syndrome expert testimony)