919 N.W.2d 335
N.D.2018Background
- In Nov. 2016 protesters and law enforcement confronted each other at a Morton County road crossing where railroad tracks met County Road 82 during Dakota Access Pipeline protests.
- Law enforcement observed a small group placing debris on the tracks; trains were held and Burlington Northern Santa Fe (BNSF) stopped service for about 1 hour 45 minutes, with a claimed cost of $2,071.19.
- Rebecca Jessee was present on or near the tracks, refused dispersal orders, was arrested and charged with tampering with a public service under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-21-06.
- At a bench trial the court found BNSF was a public service, the delay was a substantial interruption, and Jessee’s presence constituted tampering; sentence imposition was deferred for one year.
- On appeal the Supreme Court reviewed sufficiency of the evidence and whether passive presence on tracks can constitute "tampering with the tangible property of another."
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Jessee's presence on tracks constituted "tampering" with tangible property under § 12.1-21-06 | Jessee: mere passive presence does not alter, damage, or tamper with property; insufficient to prove tampering | State: presence/interference that caused a substantial interruption qualifies as tampering; points to broader statutory and analog definitions | Reversed: evidence shows trespass/unauthorized presence but not tampering with tangible property; no alteration or harmful change shown |
| Whether the statutory definition of "tampering" in another chapter (§ 49-04.1-01) should inform § 12.1-21-06 | Jessee: not applicable; different context | State: that definition supports treating "tampering" broadly to include interference | Rejected: § 49-04.1-01 is limited to its chapter and context differs; not persuasive or controlling |
| Whether the interruption (1 hr 45 min) qualified as a "substantial interruption" | Jessee: argues insufficiency of proof tying her conduct to tampering despite interruption | State: interruption duration and economic loss demonstrate substantial interruption | Court: interruption was substantial but causation from Jessee's passive presence to tampering was not shown |
| Standard of review for sufficiency of evidence | State: bench-trial findings should be upheld if competent evidence supports inference of guilt | Jessee: challenges sufficiency under established standard | Court applied standard and concluded evidence was insufficient to support tampering conviction |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Johnson, 425 N.W.2d 903 (N.D. 1988) (standard for reviewing sufficiency of evidence in criminal bench trials)
- State v. Demarais, 770 N.W.2d 246 (N.D. 2009) (standard for evaluating sufficiency of evidence and reasonable inferences)
- State v. Chacano, 817 N.W.2d 369 (N.D. 2012) (statutory interpretation reviewed de novo)
- Edinger v. Governing Auth. of Stutsman Cnty. Corr. Ctr. and Law Enforcement Ctr., 695 N.W.2d 447 (N.D. 2005) (when statutory definitions apply across statutes)
- State v. Damron, 575 N.W.2d 912 (N.D. 1998) (tampering requires harmful change; cutting telephone lines was tampering)
- W.W. Wallwork, Inc. v. Duchscherer, 501 N.W.2d 751 (N.D. 1993) (tampering with odometer involved rolling back mileage)
- In re Estate of Larsen, 143 N.W.2d 656 (N.D. 1966) (tampering requires alteration of a written instrument)
- Erickson v. North Dakota Workmen's Comp. Bureau, 123 N.W.2d 292 (N.D. 1963) (material objects must be shown free of tampering before admission)
- Faherty v. Commonwealth, 781 N.E.2d 864 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003) (vandalism inserting objects into a meter constitutes tampering)
- Kreiling v. Field, 431 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1970) (small internal movement rendering a phone inoperable was tampering)
