State v. Jerome Edmond
13-14-00682-CR
| Tex. App. | Feb 18, 2015Background
- Defendant Jerome Edmond was arrested (Mar. 20, 2013) on suspicion of DWI (third or more) and transported to the hospital; his blood was drawn at about 3:40 a.m.
- Officer Mayorga requested a blood sample after arrest; Edmond initially agreed at the scene, later withdrew consent at the hospital, and then reportedly told the officer after transport that he had in fact agreed.
- Officer waited for a supervisor's blood kit and did not seek a warrant while relying on Edmond’s initial consent; the officer proceeded with the blood draw despite Edmond’s on‑scene withdrawal at the hospital.
- The trial court granted Edmond’s motion to suppress the results of the warrantless blood draw. The State appealed, arguing the draw was constitutional under several Fourth Amendment exceptions and Texas’s mandatory blood‑draw statute (Tex. Transp. Code § 724.012).
- The State’s brief contends McNeely v. Missouri does not categorically invalidate statutory mandatory draws, and alternatively argues actual consent, exigent circumstances (reliance on revoked consent), implied‑consent waiver, search‑incident‑to‑arrest, and other factors support upholding the draw.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Edmond's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the warrantless mandatory blood draw under Tex. Transp. Code § 724.012(b)(3) was constitutional post‑McNeely | McNeely rejected only a per se exigency rule; Texas’s narrowly drawn mandatory‑draw statute and exceptions (consent, exigency, waiver, search‑incident‑to‑arrest) render the draw reasonable | Trial court: the warrantless draw violated the Fourth Amendment; no valid consent, exigency, or warrant | Trial court granted suppression of blood evidence; State appeals (brief asks reversal) |
| Whether Edmond’s initial consent, later withdrawal, and post‑draw statements constitute valid consent or waiver | Initial consent and subsequent statements (and implied‑consent statutory regime) permit reliance by officers; waiver by choosing to drive supports compelled draw | Withdrawal at hospital negated consent such that a warrant was required | Trial court found consent insufficient and suppressed evidence; State argues consent/waiver justified draw |
| Whether exigent circumstances excused obtaining a warrant (dissipation of alcohol) | Officer reliance on defendant’s initial consent created a practical exigency when consent was revoked at the last moment; McNeely allows case‑by‑case exigency analysis | McNeely prohibits a categorical exigency based merely on alcohol dissipation; no particularized exigency here | Trial court concluded exigency lacking; State contends time lost and reliance created exigency |
| Whether other exceptions (search‑incident‑to‑arrest, automobile/driver exception) justify warrantless draw | Search‑incident‑to‑arrest, diminished privacy in driving, and statutory procedural safeguards make warrantless compelled draws reasonable in limited circumstances | These exceptions do not overcome Fourth Amendment warrant requirement absent concrete exigency or valid consent | Trial court suppressed; State urges appellate reversal based on these exceptions |
Key Cases Cited
- Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013) (Supreme Court rejected a per se exigency rule based solely on alcohol dissipation)
- Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (upheld warrantless blood draw where exigent circumstances and reasonable procedures existed)
- Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (consent to search must be voluntary; governs consent analysis)
- Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973) (upheld bodily intrusion as search‑incident‑to‑arrest under exigent facts)
- Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013) (weighing governmental interests against intrusion to assess reasonableness of warrantless collection)
- Beeman v. State, 86 S.W.3d 613 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (recognized implied‑consent statutory draws as an alternative method of conducting a constitutionally valid search)