State v. Jernigan, 385 S.W.3d 776

The State filed a quo warranto petition seeking to remove Lepanto's mayor, Jernigan, for allegedly not residing within Lepanto's corporate limits.
Jernigan had previously lived outside Lepanto, then rented a Lepanto address (614 Alexander) in July 2010 for candidacy paperwork.
He later rented a city residence at 234 Greenwood (within Lepanto) beginning September 1, 2010, and claimed to reside there while still owning a home outside the city.
Jernigan filed candidacy paperwork listing 614 Alexander as his address; the county clerk testified this indicated city residency but no verification procedure existed.
The circuit court heard conflicting testimony on actual physical presence and intent, ultimately determining Jernigan resid[ed] within Lepanto and denying the petition.
The State appeals the circuit court’s denial, arguing Jernigan did not reside within Lepanto, while Jernigan maintains he complied with the residency statute.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Did Jernigan reside within Lepanto under 14-42-201(c)(1)?	Jernigan's true residence outside Lepanto means nonresidency.	Jernigan resided in Lepanto by July 2010 and continued residency there.	No clear error; State failed to prove nonresidency.
Does the word 'reside' require domiciliary intent or physical presence only?	Residency required domiciliary intent to be in Lepanto.	Residency is satisfied by physical presence within city limits; intent is not required.	Plain meaning: reside = live or physically present.
Did the circuit court clearly err in weighing credibility and evidence?	The court ignored subterfuge and found nonresidency.	Credibility determinations favor Jernigan's testimony of residence in Lepanto.	No clear error; circuit court’s credibility assessment affirmed.

Valley v. Bogard, 342 Ark. 336, 28 S.W.3d 269 (2000) (residency measured by physical presence or domicile)
Jenkins v. Bogard, 335 Ark. 334, 980 S.W.2d 270 (1998) (residence requires living or being physically present in the district)
Charisse v. Eldred, 252 Ark. 101, 477 S.W.2d 480 (1972) (residency may be shown by domicile when physical presence is lacking)
Hogan v. Davis, 243 Ark. 763, 422 S.W.2d 412 (1967) (ten-year residency requirement analyzed under domicile concepts)
Clement v. Daniels, 366 Ark. 352, 235 S.W.3d 521 (2006) (domiciliary intent can establish residency when physical presence is lacking)
Wilson v. Luck, 201 Ark. 594, 146 S.W.2d 696 (1941) (residency questions depend on individual circumstances)