State v. Jeremy R. Amidon, 198 A.3d 27

Background

Defendant was tried for lewd or lascivious conduct with his daughter (alleged touching between 2005–2007); first trial deadlocked; conviction at second trial; sentence 4–6 years.
The State sought and obtained pretrial permission to introduce evidence that defendant had been incarcerated and that his abusive behavior caused the complainant to feel safe while he was imprisoned and fearful when he was released, to explain delayed disclosure; other prior sexual-offense evidence was excluded.
During voir dire the prosecutor asked jurors whether they had learned information after service on a prior jury that left them feeling the process had been unfair; defense objected and later moved for mistrial, arguing the questioning planted suspicion that withheld prejudicial information (e.g., prior sexual-offense conviction) existed.
At trial the State introduced testimony about defendant’s incarceration and release (without disclosing the reason for incarceration) to explain the timing of the victim’s report; the court instructed the jury to consider that evidence only for timing/explanation, not for propensity.
Defense witness Ida Bessette testified she would have known if anything happened to C.A.; on cross the prosecutor asked whether Bessette’s own daughter had been molested (she answered yes); the court limited further inquiry as collateral.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether voir dire questioning by prosecutor required mistrial for juror taint	State: Questions were neutrally phrased to probe juror frustration; did not introduce extraneous info	Amidon: Questions planted suspicion jurors could discover defendant’s prior sexual-conduct conviction and thus were prejudicial	Denied. Court found questions neutral, no extraneous information introduced, no evidence jurors actually obtained improper information; no abuse of discretion
Admissibility of defendant’s prior incarceration under Rule 404(b)/403	State: Incarceration relevant to explain why complainant delayed reporting; probative value outweighs prejudice	Amidon: Any probative value outweighed by unfair prejudice of revealing incarceration	Admitted. Court exercised discretion; limited prejudice by excluding reason for incarceration and giving limiting instruction
Scope of cross-examination about witness’s awareness/bias (question re: her own daughter’s molestation)	State: Question impeaches witness’s claim she would have known if C.A. had been abused; tests capacity/credibility	Amidon: Question irrelevant, inflammatory, and collateral	Allowed limited question. Court permitted single impeachment question to test credibility and curtailed further inquiry; no abuse of discretion
Whether limiting instructions and restrictions cured any prejudice from prior-act evidence or cross-examination	State: Limiting instructions and exclusion of reason for incarceration mitigate prejudice	Amidon: Jury likely speculated about the reason and drew propensity inference	Held sufficient. Court presumed jurors followed limiting instructions; measures adequately limited unfair prejudice

Key Cases Cited

State v. Schwanda, 499 A.2d 779 (Vt. 1985) (establishes test whether jury irregularity had capacity to influence deliberations and burden-shifting)
State v. Wool, 648 A.2d 655 (Vt. 1994) (defendant entitled to jury free of extraneous influences)
State v. McKeen, 685 A.2d 1090 (Vt. 1996) (deference to trial court’s exercise of discretion on new-trial motions)
State v. Bruyette, 604 A.2d 1270 (Vt. 1992) (Rule 404(b) evidence must still satisfy Rule 403 balancing)
State v. Searles, 621 A.2d 1281 (Vt. 1993) (probative contextual facts can be necessary for narrative coherence and "ring of truth")
State v. Messier, 885 A.2d 1193 (Vt. 2005) (presumption that jurors follow limiting instructions)
State v. Jackson, 227 A.2d 280 (Vt. 1967) (scope of cross-examination on collateral matters; impeachment limited to witness’s answers)