State v. Jensen, 2017 SD 18

In 1996, 14-year-old Paul Dean Jensen and a 16-year-old accomplice robbed a taxi driver; Jensen shot and killed the driver and was later convicted of first-degree murder and kidnapping. He was originally sentenced to concurrent mandatory life terms.
Jensen’s convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal in State v. Jensen, 1998 S.D. 52, 579 N.W.2d 613.
After Miller v. Alabama barred mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juvenile homicide offenders, Jensen moved to correct his sentence; following Montgomery (which made Miller retroactive), the circuit court held a 2016 resentencing hearing.
At resentencing the court received extensive evidence on Jensen’s youth-related mitigation, his subsequent maturation, and expert testimony about parole systems (the older discretionary parole system under which Jensen was sentenced vs. a newer presumptive-release system).
The court resentenced Jensen to concurrent 200-year terms (eligible for discretionary parole at age 39; presumptive good-time release would not occur until age 116). Jensen appealed, arguing his sentence is cruel and unusual and the court abused its discretion.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Jensen)	Held
Whether concurrent 200-year terms violate the Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual)	Sentence lawful because Jensen received individualized resentencing under Miller and therefore Eighth Amendment concerns are addressed	Sentence is the functional equivalent of life without parole because parole under the old discretionary system may never grant release; parole board need not consider Miller factors	Affirmed: Not cruel and unusual. Court found Miller factors considered and individualized sentencing complied with Miller; lack of statutory requirement that parole board apply Miller factors does not render the sentence unconstitutional
Whether the sentencing court abdicated its sentencing discretion to the parole board (abuse of discretion)	Court exercised discretion after weighing youth mitigation, offense circumstances, and rehabilitation prospects; references to parole did not transfer sentencing authority	Court improperly deferred to parole board and thus left whether Jensen serves life effectively to parole decisions	Affirmed: No abuse. Court considered evidence, acquired familiarity with Jensen, and imposed a discretionary lengthy term after weighing Miller factors

Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (barring mandatory life without parole for juvenile homicide offenders)
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (holding Miller applies retroactively)
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (prohibiting death penalty for juvenile offenders)
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (prohibiting life without parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders)
State v. Jensen, 579 N.W.2d 613 (S.D. 1998) (affirming original convictions and mandatory life sentences)
State v. Springer, 856 N.W.2d 460 (S.D. 2014) (interpreting Miller and requiring sentencing courts to consider mitigating qualities of youth)
State v. Diaz, 887 N.W.2d 751 (S.D. 2016) (upholding lengthy term-of-years where juvenile sentencing considered Miller factors)
Atwell v. State, 197 So. 3d 1040 (Fla. 2016) (concluding parole opportunity under prior system did not cure lack of Miller-style individualized sentencing and ordering resentencing)