State v. Jensen, 2017 SD 18

In 1996 Paul Dean Jensen, age 14 at the time, was convicted in adult court of first‑degree murder and kidnapping and received concurrent mandatory life sentences.
After Miller v. Alabama (2012) barred mandatory life‑without‑parole sentences for juvenile homicide offenders, Jensen moved to correct his sentence; Montgomery v. Louisiana later made Miller retroactive and the circuit court granted resentencing.
At the 2016 resentencing hearing both sides presented expert testimony about Jensen’s youth, upbringing, mental health, maturation, and prospects for rehabilitation; the State also presented evidence on South Dakota’s former (discretionary) parole system.
The court resentenced Jensen to concurrent 200‑year terms (with discretionary parole eligibility at age 39 and presumptive good‑time release at age 116) after expressly considering the Miller mitigating‑youth factors.
Jensen appealed, arguing (1) the 200‑year concurrent sentences are cruel and unusual (Eighth Amendment) and effectively amount to life without parole given the old parole system, and (2) the court abused its discretion by delegating sentencing authority to the parole board.

Issue	State's Argument	Jensen's Argument	Held
Whether concurrent 200‑year sentences constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment	Jensen received an individualized Miller resentencing and a discretionary term of years with parole eligibility, so sentence is constitutional	Sentence is the functional equivalent of life without parole because under the old parole system the parole board need not consider youth‑related factors and could keep him incarcerated for life	Court held sentence is not cruel and unusual; Miller requirements satisfied and absence of parole‑board Miller‑factor rule does not render sentence unconstitutional
Whether the sentencing court abused its discretion by abdicating sentencing to the parole board	Court conducted a full resentencing, considered Miller factors and evidence, and imposed a discretionary term of years—no abdication	Court referred to parole process and stated it was not well‑equipped to perform parole‑type review, thereby abdicating sentencing discretion to parole board	Court held no abuse of discretion; sentencing court independently weighed evidence, considered youth‑related mitigation, and imposed sentence after thorough review

Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (barred mandatory life without parole for juvenile homicide offenders)
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (made Miller retroactive)
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (barred death penalty for juvenile offenders)
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (barred life without parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders)
State v. Springer, 856 N.W.2d 460 (S.D. 2014) (S.D. courts must consider mitigating qualities of youth post‑Miller)
State v. Jensen, 579 N.W.2d 613 (S.D. 1998) (affirming Jensen’s original convictions and sentences)
State v. Diaz, 887 N.W.2d 751 (S.D. 2016) (distinguishing parole systems in assessing whether a juvenile sentence is effectively life)
Atwell v. State, 197 So. 3d 1040 (Fla. 2016) (Florida Supreme Court ordered resentencing where discretionary parole system did not require consideration of Miller factors and release date effectively beyond natural life)