292 A.3d 689
Vt.2023Background
- In August 2018 Jeffrey Young fired multiple shots from his home, wounding his adult son; Young was arrested and charged with several felonies and held without bail.
- Counsel changed and the court ordered a competency evaluation; a competency report in January 2019 found Young competent, but Young later sought an independent evaluation and filed several pretrial motions.
- The court and parties initially anticipated trial readiness in mid-2019; the State moved to continue a November 2019 trial date to March 2020 (to which Young did not object), and Young later stipulated he was competent and agreed to a May 27, 2020 trial date.
- On March 16, 2020 this Court’s Administrative Order 49 paused all jury trials due to COVID-19; Young first invoked his speedy-trial right on April 22, 2020 and renewed it via omnibus motion in June 2020.
- The trial began November 1, 2021 (about 38 months after arrest). The trial court applied Barker balancing, excluded defense-caused delays (competency and defense motions), found Young’s late assertion of the right significant, found no actual prejudice, and denied dismissal; convictions followed and Young appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Young’s Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was violated (Barker balancing) | No violation: after excluding defense delays, remaining delay and circumstances do not show a violation | Violation: overall long delay (≈38 months) denied his speedy-trial rights | No violation: Barker factors weighed against Young overall (first favored Young lightly; third heavily favored State; second and fourth neutral) |
| Whether delays attributable to competency proceedings and defense motions are counted in the speedy-trial clock | Those delays are excluded from the delay calculation | All elapsed time (including pandemic period) should count toward presumptive prejudice | Excluded: competency and defense-requested delays removed, leaving ~20 months to consider for Barker analysis |
| Whether pandemic-related delays (A.O.49) require treating the State’s postponement as heavily prejudicial | Pandemic delays are attributable to the State but are neutral/extraordinary logistical issues, not bad-faith | COVID-19 pause should weigh heavily against the State and support dismissal/presumptive prejudice | Pandemic delays attributable to the State but did not show bad faith or negligence and thus did not weigh heavily for Young |
| Whether Young established presumptive (nonparticularized) prejudice under Doggett | No: Young cannot show State bad faith or negligence in prosecuting with reasonable diligence | Yes: the ~38‑month delay presumptively prejudiced his defense; urges per se rule for such delay | Presumptive prejudice not established: delay reduced for analysis and prosecution showed reasonable diligence; Young also failed to show actual prejudice |
Key Cases Cited
- Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (establishes four-factor speedy-trial balancing test)
- Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (explains presumptive nonparticularized prejudice and role of government bad faith/negligence)
- Vermont v. Brillon, 556 U.S. 81 (delays caused by defense counsel are attributable to the defendant)
- State v. Lafaso, 251 A.3d 935 (application of Barker factors in Vermont; context-sensitive weighting)
- State v. Labrecque, 249 A.3d 671 (mem.) (COVID-19 logistical delays attributable to the State but treated as neutral/extraordinary)