State v. Jefferson
302 Ga. 435
Ga.2017Background
- Five defendants (Brenton Jefferson et al.) were charged with attempted murder, aggravated battery, kidnapping, and violations of Georgia’s Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act; the State sought to introduce certified convictions of alleged gang members under OCGA § 16-15-9 to prove gang existence.
- Appellees moved in limine arguing § 16-15-9 is facially unconstitutional under the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause because it permits admission of third-party convictions without live testimony or cross-examination.
- The trial court granted the motion, excluding third-party convictions and finding the statute unconstitutional to the extent it authorized admitting convictions of non-testifying non-parties.
- The State appealed; the Georgia Supreme Court reviewed whether the statute facially violates the Confrontation Clause.
- The court focused on whether convictions of non-testifying third parties used to prove an element (existence of a criminal street gang) are testimonial and thus inadmissible without prior opportunity for cross-examination.
- The court affirmed: OCGA § 16-15-9 is unconstitutional on its face insofar as it authorizes admission of convictions of non-testifying non-parties to prove gang existence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether OCGA § 16-15-9 facially violates the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause by allowing third-party convictions to prove gang existence | Appellees: Admission of non-testifying third-party convictions is testimonial and deprives defendants of the right to confront witnesses; statute mirrors the condemned practice in Kirby | State: Convictions are public/business-type records or may be introduced via an expert; statute merely permits use of certified convictions to prove gang existence | Held: The statute is unconstitutional on its face to the extent it permits admission of convictions of non-testifying non-parties to prove a gang (violates Confrontation Clause) |
| Whether third-party convictions are non-testimonial public records exempt from confrontation requirements | Appellees: Convictions arise from trials/pleas and are testimonial because they reflect adjudicative facts, not routine administrative records | State: Such convictions should be treated like public/business records and admissible without confrontation | Held: Third-party convictions used to prove underlying facts (existence of a gang) are testimonial and not saved by public-record exceptions |
| Whether use of an expert can cure confrontation problems when introducing third-party convictions | Appellees: Expert testimony cannot substitute for cross-examination of witnesses who produced the convictions or test the factual basis of those convictions | State: Introducing convictions through a gang expert or eliciting their effect avoids confrontation concerns | Held: Use of an expert does not cure the Sixth Amendment problem; convictions themselves are testimonial and inadmissible without prior opportunity for cross-examination |
Key Cases Cited
- Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47 (statute admitting convictions of principals to prove receiver’s guilt violated Confrontation Clause)
- Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (testimonial statements require prior opportunity for cross-examination)
- Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (forensic reports can be testimonial; public-record exception limited)
- Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647 (testimonial forensic reports require testimony by actual analyst or prior opportunity for cross-examination)
- Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (distinguishing testimonial vs. nontestimonial statements in Confrontation Clause analysis)
- United States v. Causevic, 636 F.3d 998 (8th Cir.) (judgments/convictions treated as testimonial when used to prove elements of another’s crime)