State v. JeffersonÂ, 252 N.C. App. 174

In 2009, then-15-year-old Shymel D. Jefferson fired a gun in a street altercation; one person (Timothy Seay) was killed and others wounded. Shell casings and ballistic evidence tied Jefferson’s .380 to wounds.
Jefferson was indicted in superior court and convicted by a jury of first-degree murder under the felony-murder rule. He was initially sentenced to mandatory life without parole (LWOP).
After the U.S. Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama (holding mandatory LWOP for juveniles unconstitutional), North Carolina enacted N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.19B, which prescribes life with parole eligibility after 25 years for juvenile offenders convicted solely under the felony-murder rule.
On remand the trial court resentenced Jefferson to life with parole eligibility after 25 years; Jefferson appealed, arguing § 15A-1340.19B(a)(1) is unconstitutional because it does not require individualized consideration of youth-related mitigating factors per Miller.
The Court of Appeals reviewed the facial constitutional challenge de novo and affirmed, concluding Miller’s individualized-sentencing requirement applies to mandatory LWOP (or its functional equivalent) but has not been extended by the U.S. Supreme Court to mandatory life-with-parole terms like North Carolina’s 25-year parole eligibility scheme.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Jefferson)	Held
Whether N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.19B(a)(1) is facially unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment because it does not require individualized consideration of youth before imposing a mandatory life-with-parole sentence	The statute is constitutional; Miller’s requirement targets mandatory LWOP (the State’s most severe penalties) and does not clearly extend to life-with-parole terms that provide meaningful parole opportunity	Miller requires individualized sentencing for juveniles generally; thus a mandatory life-with-parole sentence (even with parole after 25 years) still mandates a life term without sufficient judicial discretion to consider youth-related mitigation	Affirmed. The court held Miller’s rule is tied to LWOP (or its functional equivalent). North Carolina’s 25-year parole-eligibility scheme provides a constitutionally adequate “meaningful opportunity” for release and is not facially invalid under the Eighth Amendment

Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (mandatory life without parole for juveniles violates the Eighth Amendment; requires consideration of youth-related mitigating factors)
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (juvenile death penalty unconstitutional; juveniles are categorically less culpable)
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (LWOP for nonhomicide juvenile offenders is unconstitutional; juveniles must have meaningful opportunity for release)
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016) (Miller applies retroactively and states may remedy Miller violations by permitting parole consideration rather than resentencing)
Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980) (recognition that life-with-parole sentences are functionally distinct from LWOP because parole may prevent actual life-long imprisonment)