State v. Jedlicka
900 N.W.2d 454
| Neb. | 2017Background
- Defendant Paul J. Jedlicka was convicted by a jury of first-degree sexual assault of a child under 12 after the victim, M.B., described digital penetration that occurred while she was sleeping at the defendant’s residence.
- The child disclosed the assault at school; a teacher reported it to Child Protective Services and law enforcement, who arranged a forensic interview at Project Harmony the same day.
- Forensic interviewer April Anderson conducted a recorded NCAC‑protocol interview observed by police; Project Harmony nurse practitioner Sarah Cleaver used information from Anderson (via summary) to decide on and conduct a medical exam and evidence-collection steps.
- The court admitted the Project Harmony interview recording (Exhibit 2) over defendant’s hearsay objection under Neb. Evid. R. 803(3) (medical-diagnosis/treatment exception); defendant moved to dismiss at close of the State’s case, which was denied.
- On appeal Jedlicka challenged (1) admission of the recorded interview under Rule 803(3), (2) ineffective assistance of trial counsel, and (3) sufficiency of the evidence; the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of recorded forensic interview under Neb. Evid. R. 803(3) | State: interview was in the chain of medical care and statements were reasonably pertinent to diagnosis/treatment | Jedlicka: interview was investigatory, not in chain of medical care; child did not intend statement for medical diagnosis/treatment | Court: Admissible — interviewer acted in chain of medical care; circumstances supported inference that statements were made in contemplation of medical diagnosis/treatment |
| Hearsay dual-purpose statements to law enforcement present | State: dual-purpose statements admissible if they have value for diagnosis/treatment and meet two-prong test | Jedlicka: presence of law enforcement and investigatory purpose negates medical intent | Held: Dual-purpose statements admissible when proponent shows (1) declarant’s purpose was to assist medical diagnosis/treatment and (2) statements reasonably pertinent to diagnosis/treatment; both satisfied here |
| Ineffective assistance of counsel — constructive denial (Cronic) | Jedlicka: cumulative attorney errors deprived him of meaningful adversarial testing | State: trial counsel actively advocated; errors (if any) are bad lawyering, not total failure | Held: Cronic not triggered; no complete failure to subject prosecution to meaningful testing; claims evaluated (or deferred) under Strickland |
| Ineffective assistance of counsel — specific failures (Strickland) | Jedlicka: counsel failed to object/preserve, impeach, call rebuttal experts, and otherwise test State’s case | State: record insufficient to resolve many claims on direct appeal; some alleged failures show no prejudice | Held: Some claims lack merit; others cannot be resolved on direct appeal because the record is insufficient — potential postconviction development required |
| Sufficiency of evidence | State: victim testimony + other evidence sufficient | Jedlicka: inconsistencies and lack of physical evidence make conviction unsupported | Held: Evidence, viewed in State’s favor, was sufficient for a rational jury to convict; motion to dismiss properly overruled |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-part ineffective-assistance test: deficient performance + prejudice)
- United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984) (narrow circumstances where prejudice is presumed due to constructive denial of counsel)
- State v. Vigil, 283 Neb. 129 (2012) (forensic interviewer statements may be admissible under medical-diagnosis exception when in chain of medical care)
- State v. Herrera, 289 Neb. 575 (2014) (discusses rationale and scope of Rule 803(3) medical-diagnosis exception)
- Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685 (2002) (distinguishes Strickland and Cronic; failure must be complete for Cronic to apply)
- Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175 (2004) (reinforces rarity of presuming prejudice under Cronic and stresses counsel must entirely fail to function as advocate)