State v. Jasa
297 Neb. 822
| Neb. | 2017Background
- Shortly after midnight on Feb 14, 2015, Lincoln officers were dispatched after Lincoln Fire & Rescue reported a pickup "all over the road." Officers located the pickup and observed it weaving and (per officer testimony) briefly crossing the lane line with the driver-side tires. The officers initiated a traffic stop.
- Field sobriety tests and a preliminary breath test at the scene led to Jasa’s arrest for DUI. At the county jail, a Class B-permit officer administered an evidentiary breath test showing 0.191 g/210L.
- Before the breath test, Officer Morrow observed Jasa for 15 minutes for belching/vomiting and then completed the required checklist (Attachment 16). Officer Sears—identified on the checklist as the permit holder—administered the breath test; both officers were present.
- After the test, officers advised Jasa he could arrange independent testing and use the jail telephone; Jasa remained in custody and did not arrange a contemporaneous independent blood test (he later made multiple calls and inquiries without success).
- Jasa moved to suppress the breath result, arguing (1) the traffic stop lacked reasonable suspicion/probable cause, (2) the 15-minute observation requirement under title 177 was not properly executed, and (3) § 60-6,199 rights to independent testing were violated. The district court denied suppression; Jasa was convicted and appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Jasa's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Legality of traffic stop (reasonable suspicion/probable cause) | LFR tip + officer observations insufficient; no violation of municipal straddle rule | Officer observed weaving and (per testimony) crossing lane line; any traffic violation justifies stop | Stop justified; officer had objective basis (weaving/line crossing) to stop vehicle |
| 15-minute observation under title 177 (foundation for breath test) | Tester (Sears) did not himself observe the full 15 minutes and did not discuss observations with the observing officer, so checklist requirement unmet | Attachment 16 was completed; Morrow (permit holder) personally observed 15 minutes, was present for test, and certified the checklist; title 177 does not require same officer to both observe and administer | Foundation satisfied; checklist tasks were performed and breath test admissible |
| Scope of compliance: method vs technique (impact on admissibility) | Any noncompliance with title 177 should render test inadmissible | Even imperfect execution affects weight not admissibility once foundational elements proven | Court did not need to resolve method/technique split because foundational requirements were met; admissible |
| § 60-6,199 (right to independent testing) | Officers should have done more (transport, assist) because Jasa was in custody and nonbondable; failure prevented exculpatory testing | Officer advised Jasa he could arrange independent testing and allowed telephone access; police have no duty to transport or arrange testing—only must not hamper attempts | No violation. Under State v. Dake, police need not assist beyond permitting calls; suppression not warranted |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. McCumber, 295 Neb. 941 (two-part review standard for suppression rulings)
- State v. McIntyre, 290 Neb. 1021 (statutory/regulatory interpretation reviewed de novo)
- State v. Bol, 288 Neb. 144 (Fourth Amendment limits on investigatory stops)
- State v. Sanders, 289 Neb. 335 (traffic violation provides probable cause to stop)
- State v. Baue, 258 Neb. 968 (four foundational elements for admitting breath test)
- State v. Dake, 247 Neb. 579 (police need not transport/arrange independent testing; must not hamper and must allow phones)
- State v. Miller, 213 Neb. 274 (noncompliance with technique affects weight/credibility)
- State v. Huff, 279 Neb. 68 (appellate affirmation on alternative grounds)
- State v. Rodriguez, 288 Neb. 714 (statutory interpretation limits)
- State v. Arizola, 295 Neb. 477 (plain-meaning rule for statutes)
- State v. Wood, 296 Neb. 738 (do not look beyond plain statutory language)
